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This study was designed to investigate the effects that the use of 
alignment talk can have on the relational inferences being made within  
conversations. The communication literature illustrates how understanding 
conversations depends on conversants' abilities to make appropriate 
inferences. The literature also supports the notion that conversants come to 
meanings on a relational level at the same time they process and 
understand the explicit content of a conversation.
Conversants use alignment conventions within conversations in order to  
assure that they are being understood. Alignment conventions fall into two  
general categories. First, housekeeping alignment talk focuses on the 
language being used within the conversation. Substantive alignment talk  
refers to events outside of the conversation.
Subjects were given five different examples of one type of alignment talk 
within five different conversations. Altogether, six different types of 
alignment talk were tested. Subjects then gave their impressions of each 
conversant within the conversations using 22 seven point likert type scales.
Factor analysis revealed three dimensions of subjects' evaluations: 1) a 
niceness dimension, 2) a dominance dimension and 3) a status dimension. 
Multivariate analysis of variance produced statistically significant differences 
on the dominance varible between speakers using hedges or a mitigating  
excuse and speakers using agendizing. Also, a significant main effect was 
present for conversational scenario.
This study indicates that the use of alignment talk can function as a basis 
for inferences in conversations. Implications for future language studies are 
discussed, including suggestions for how language researchers can 
effectively deal with general context.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
In any given human interaction, people have a plethora of communicative 
options open to them. They choose to speak or not and, if they do speak, the 
choices of lexicon and style available to them approach infinity. Even when one 
decides upon the basic meaning one wants to express, there are a variety of ways 
to encode the message linguistically. Within conversations, people make linguistic 
choices fairly rapidly and seemingly without much effort. Intuitively we know that 
the way we talk depends on the situation. One salient factor in any situation is our 
relationship with those around us. Our talk simultaneously reflects and defines our 
human relationships.
As listeners we regularly come to understandings well beyond those which 
are explicitly coded linguistically. We assume, infer, and extrapolate on a regular 
basis. We draw our conclusions and make our subsequent contributions to the 
conversation based on our assumptions, inferences and extrapolations. On the 
content level, we are regularly expected to make bridging inferences or to fill in 
background information. We look to what is explicitly coded largely as a guide to 
where to make the inferences. On another level of meaning, we look to a variety of 
cues, including conversational style, to inform us about the relationships that are 
evolving.
There is a considerable amount of descriptive literature on conversation.
1
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Ethnomethodologists have identified a number of conventions that conversants use 
to facilitate understandings. One common convention, alignment talk, functions to 
provide an interpretative frame around messages. That is, alignment talk tells us 
how something "should be taken".
The purpose of this study is to identify some of the inferences people make 
on the relationship level based on the use of alignment conventions. In other 
words, this study attempts to answer the question: What does the use of 
alignment talk signal about the nature of the relationship evolving between the 
conversants? Often, researchers have stated that certain linguistic conventions 
indicate some relational state such as dominance or powerlessness (Bradac & 
Mulac, 1984; Bradley, 1981; Owsley & Scotton, 1984; Ragan, 1983; Ragan 8i Hopper, 
1981; Warfel, 1984), or signal attributes such as tentativeness or social status 
(Callary, 1974; Mulac, 1976; Hewitt & Stokes, 1975). This research investigates 
whether or not conversants infer relational information based on alignment talk. 
Specifically, this research tests how the use of alignment talk impacts on on the 
dimensions of perceived dominance, friendliness, socio-intellectual status and 
dynamism of the speaker.
1.1. CONVERSATIONAL INFERENCES
As Jerome Bruner (1973) has written, people regularly go beyond the 
information given. Scholars in communication have not ignored the central role 
that inference making plays in having conversations. Anyone ever faced with even 
a short transcription of a conversation has been forced to deal with the reality that
3
much of what the participants have come to understand is not to be found in print 
on the transcript. The communication literature addresses the role of inferences 
from two basic perspectives, which will be discussed below. First, on the local 
utterance-by-utterance level, we depend on bridging inferences to make sense out 
of a series of utterances and second, on a more abstract level, people make 
inferences regarding the nature of the episode as it unfolds.
1.1.1. Content Centered Inferences
Language use and understanding can be conceptualized as a problem solving 
activity involving the assesment and strategic exploitation of mutual knowledge 
and internal cognitive information (van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983; Jacobs, 1985). Both 
the planning and execution of utterances and their processing and understanding 
require the consideration of vast amounts of information external to the 
conversation. Hopper (1981) contends that a great number of types of inferences 
discussed in disparate literature can be considered together as the taken -fo r- 
granted in communication. He notes there is a great deal which is left uncoded but 
is expected to be understood. He further notes that communicators have more 
efficient ways of dealing with the taken-for-granted than scholars do in 
understanding them.
Even the simplest utterance presupposes something. Clark and Clark (1977) 
get to the heart of this idea in their articulation of the given/new contract. They 
explain that by syntactic arrangement or by paralinguistic cues, an utterance may 
imply that the hearer should already have certain background information. "It was 
your brother who stole the money" presumes the hearer knows money was stolen, 
that is the given, and the new information is that the brother did the stealing.
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We also depend on inferences to link statements to one another. Our 
communication depends on bridging inferences (Clark & Haviland, 1977) or what 
Grice (1975) termed implicature (from the speakers perspective). Speakers do not 
spell out every detail of what they intend to communicate. They leave it to the 
listener to make the bridging inferences. Another example by Clark and Clark 
illustrates the idea.
Mary got the picnic supplies out of the car. The beer was warm (1977, p.
97).
This sequence requires the hearer to infer that the beer was part of the picnic 
supplies.
The point here is that meanings actually consist of the utterance plus any 
inferences required to make the utterance understandable. The psychological 
reality of this claim becomes apparent when we note that inferences are recalled 
as efficiently as assertions and are generally remembered as having actually been 
asserted (Harris & Monaco, 1978).
Overall, conversationalists operate under, and presume that others are 
operating under, a prevailing norm of cooperation. Brown and Levinson (1978) point 
this out as a universal politeness phenomenon in language. Grice (1975) expresses 
much the same idea as a general cooperative principle with four guiding maxims. 
According to Grice (1975), conversations generally proceed with each participant 
being as informative as required, truthful, relevant and clear.
The prevailing assumption of cooperation is so strong that when an 
utterance is profferred that may appear uncooperative in some way, hearers make
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the inferences required to make sense of the utterance. Sanders (1983) argues 
convincingly for the presumption of coherence in conversations in light of our 
willingness to make them cohere through our interpretations. This is essentially 
the same point made by Jacobs (1985) when he notes that utterances are 
"normalized" by the hearer making the inferences she thinks the speaker intended 
her to make. In other words, we often construct a context which makes sense out 
of any exchange of words. We regularly call up the inferences needed to 
understand.
1.1.2. Relationally Centered Inferences
Another perspective on inferences looks beyond the content level of 
meaning. We do not view our interactions with others as simply exchanges of 
information. While some authors deal with inferences on the content level alone 
(Clark & Clark, 1977; Clark & Haviland, 1977; Grice, 1975; Halliday, 1967; Harris 8. 
Monaco, 1978) others speak of "general world knowledge" (for example: Beach, 
1983; van Dijk, 1980; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983; Sanders, 1983) which seems to 
include relational elements also. The notion of a speech act (Austin, 1962; Searle, 
1965, 1975) or a symbolic act (Frentz & Farrell, 1976) is centered upon relational 
implications. An utterance has significance in that it does something to the hearer. 
We compliment, flirt, insult, patronize and a number of other things within 
conversations. Our understandings within, and general impressions of 
conversations include an impression of what the other has accomplished with his 
contributions. These impressions are most often communicated implicitly.
Identifying the intended or interpreted function of a given utterance can be
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problematic since the same linguistic form can serve multiple functions and the 
same function can be fulfilled by a variety of alternations. Studies of indirect 
responses (Nofsinger, 1976; Pearce & Conklin, 1979) begin with the realization that 
a question or an answer is a speech act function, not a linguistic form. For 
example, an interogative form may be a question but may also be a request ("Can 
you pass the salt?") or an insult ("Are you stupid?").
In general, there is agreement that the available alternations survive because 
they serve important interpersonal functions (Ervin-Tripp, 1976). We are aware 
that the forms we use signal something on the relational level. There is also 
agreement that the meaning of a speech act is contextualized by the general 
episode (Frentz & Farrell, 1976; Pearce, 1976; Searle, 1975). The relationship 
between speech acts and episodes is reflexive in that conversants simultaneously 
define the episode by referring to the speech acts within it and look to their 
impression of the episode to help them interpret the meaning of the speech acts.
Subtle variations within the basic forms of a speech act have been shown to  
have substantial effects in prior research (Cantor, 1979; Enzle & Harvey, 1982). 
Cantor (1979) tested a variety of polite requests for money. The forms she used 
might intuitively be judged as equal in politeness and appropriateness. But she 
found a polite imperative ("Please contribute to our fund") to be more effective 
than other forms, such as an agreement question ("Won't you contribute to our 
fund?"). Likewise, Enzle and Harvey (1982) found a rhetorical agreem ent form of 
request ("You will do X, won't you?") to be significantly more effective than a 
simple interogative ("Will you do X?"). The point here is that the different
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implications of distinctly different forms of a speech act are often obvious. For 
example, "Do moose lay eggs?" and "No sir" both function to answer a question in 
the negative. But, each sends distinctly different messages about the relationship 
and the situation. The differences in the forms tested by Cantor (1979) and Enzle 
and Harvey (1982) are not so obvious. Their results indicate those subtle 
differences may be important.
The evidence cited above, along with indications that syntax alone can lead 
hearers to make correct inferences about speakers (Callary, 1974), suggests that 
conversationalists are affected by subtle, seemingly insignificant linguistic choices. 
This is consistent with psychological evidence that people often cannot report on 
the existence of critical stimuli, particularly if the stimuli do not seem to be a 
plausible cause of the response (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). In other words, we may 
make inferences subconsciously because of subtle linguistic cues even if those 
cues do not seem like reasonable bases for inferences.
1.1.3. Summary
The study of human communication must include the study of what is not 
said but is still understood. On the content level, we link utterances together and 
usually provide whatever inferences are necessary to make sense out of a 
conversation. We converse under a pervasive norm of cooperation and interpret 
with that norm in mind. Our inferences are not limited to being strictly 
informational, but also occur on a relational level when conversants come to 
meanings in regards to the nature of a speech act or episode. These levels of 
meaning seem to be relationally centered. Finally, communicators may not be
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aware of how linguistic choices affect their inferences. Subtle changes in the form  
of a speech act may direct hearers to make different inferences.
1.2. CONTENT AND RELATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF COMMUNICATION
The discussion above presumes that human communication carries both a 
content and a relational message. This notion is often traced to Bateson's (1951) 
distinction between the report and command functions of communication. 
Basically, he noted that a message simultaneously reports about the state of 
events at a previous moment and acts as the cause of events to follow (the 
command). The concept has evolved into the notion that our communication 
constantly and unavoidably defines our relationships as we exchange messages. 
Every utterance not only conveys information, the content, but often implicitly 
makes a statement about the previous and projected state of the interpersonal 
relationship of the conversants. As Wilmot (1980) states it: "every message has 
elements of 'this is how I see you in relation to me'" (p. 63).
Exactly how our communication can define our relationships has been 
discussed at length in the literature (for example, Haley, 1963; Watzlawick, Beavin & 
Jackson, 1967). The relational aspect of communication has been presumed as a 
starting point for a variety of research (for example, Burgoon 8i Hale, 1984; Millar & 
Rogers, 1976; Morton, Alexander &  Altman, 1976).
Intuitively, we know that messages impact on our relationships. Extreme 
cases where someone constantly insults us or berates us most often defines the 
relationship as adversarial. Or, the person who constantly winks at us, compliments
g
us and asks us out on dates defines the relationship as one characterized by 
romantic interest. Most of us learned from our mothers that being summoned in a 
formal manner ("Jerry Monroe Jordan, come here") signaled a particular state of 
the relationship at that time. What is of interest here are the elements of that 
relational message and how we as communicators come to understandings on the 
relational level. This study is aimed at identifying types of inferences 
communicators are led to make when certain linguistic choices are profferred.
1.3. ALIGNMENT TALK
Human behaviors, including linguistic behaviors, are often ambiguous in that 
people can reasonably attach any one of a number of interpretations to an act. The 
same action can be appropriate and admirable in one context and significantly 
inappropriate and discrediting in another. Often we are aware that others may view  
our actions in ways other than the way we would like them to. People frequently 
choose to manage such problematic events verbally through alignment talk. As 
Hewitt and Stokes (1975) define them, aligning acts are "largely verbal efforts to 
restore meaningful interaction in the face of problematic situations..." (p. 838). In 
other words, when faced with a situation where we fear others may be 
misinterpreting us in some manner, we often choose to verbally address the 
problem and attempt to ensure mutual understanding.
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1.3.1. Substantive and Housekeeping Acts
Some clear distinctions can be made between types or functions of
alignment talk. Weiner and Goodenough (1977) have proposed that speech acts (or 
moves within their game metaphor) can be classified as either substantive or 
management (housekeeping) acts. They explain that substantive moves make up 
the subject matter of the conversation; these acts provide the information. Saying, 
"good morning" or "I have the keys" or relaying any type of information as people 
do in conversations entails a substantive act. A management or housekeeping act 
adds nothing new to the content of the conversation, but is there to clarify and 
direct. For instance, saying, "listen to this" or "huh?" functions mainly to manage 
the interaction. Often, a simple pass in a conversation, where one party gives up a 
turn and signals to the other to keep talking, can play a housekeeping role (Weiner 
& Goodenough, 1977).
The distinction between housekeeping and substantive acts is roughly
analogous to the distinction between function and content words made in
linguistics (Weiner & Goodenough, 1977). Housekeeping talk has little or no
referential value, but instead functions to let conversants instruct one another in 
how to treat what has gone on before and how to  proceed (McLaughlin, 1984). 
Conversation can be ambiguous even to those creating it. Therefore, some of the 
talk often must serve to keep conversants "in synch", in alignment.
The functions of alignment talk also fall into two general categories roughly 
parallel to the distinctions made above. That is, some alignment talk serves mainly 
to clarify and direct and other forms add new content. But first, to extend the
11
definition of alignment talk somewhat, it is useful to think of alignment talk as 
consensus building (Ragan & Hopper, 1981). The goal of alignment talk in general 
is to facilitate shared meaning. Alignment talk can be seen as a species of 
metacommunication in that it provides a frame informing communicators how talk 
should be interpreted (Hopper, 1981; Ragan & Hopper, 1981; Ragan, 1983).
Each of the two general categories of alignment talk cluster by how they are 
metacommunicative. Some alignment talk is metacommunicative in the sense that 
it refers directly to the talk occurring between the conversants. In this sense it is 
also metalinguistic in that it refers directly to the verbal properties of the talk. 
These types of alignment talk function the local utterance-by-utterance level of 
discourse. Alignment talk from this perspective plays a housekeeping role within 
the discourse. Other types of alignment talk, from the more traditional symbolic 
interactionist perspective, refer to deeds that have occurred outside the 
conversation. In these cases the conversation becomes centered on defining and 
interpreting some action. This talk is metacommunicative in the sense that it 
serves to define identities and relationships fairly explicitly. The former category 
serves to bring communicators into alignment with each other. The latter is 
concerned with bringing some action into alignment with some extrinsic rule.
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1.3.2. Housekeeping Alignment Talk
The communication literature discusses several verbal conventions which 
play a housekeeping role within the discourse. Communicators often engage in 
repair sequences to try to ensure understanding. Beyond this, conversants often 
use more subtle forms of metatalk (talk about talk) to help organize, direct and 
interpret the conversation. This metatalk can be divided into two general 
categories by function. Some metatalk is mostly organizational while other forms 
serve to evaluate talk.
1.3.2.1. conversational repairs
One very common form of alignment talk which falls into the first general 
category of discourse centered, housekeeping alignment talk is the conversational 
repair within a side sequence. In a side sequence (Jefferson, 1972) conversants 
temporarily "step outside" the subject matter of the conversation for some reason, 
often to clarify some meaning within the main sequence, as in the example below.
A: ...and I want to know what you think about it.
B: I am appalled.
A: Yer...a Paul?
B: That's right, I am appalled 
A: Yeh, uh...what's that?
(from Jefferson, 1972, p. 311)
In this example the interactants are using the side sequence as a way to 
clarify what each is doing in the conversation. As Zahn (1984) points out, all 
repairs play an alignment role in that they are performed in response to problems 
with message elements, problems usually concerned with comprehension and 
cooperation. Repairs are mentioned here because they illustrate conceptually how
13
people work to stay in alignment. In a sense, all aligning moves can be viewed as 
repairs. The focus of this study is to illuminate the effects of specific alignment 
conventions within repairs.
1.3.2.2. organizational m etata lk
Other forms within the category of housekeeping alignment talk are 
metalinguistic in nature. This metatalk refers explicitly to the verbal properties of a 
message (Ragan & Hopper, 1981; Ragan, 1983; Schiffrin, 1980). Metatalk often 
functions to organize or bracket discourse (McLaughlin, 1984; Schiffrin, 1980). 
These organizational brackets may refer to one's own talk ("I'll put it this way") or 
to the other's talk ("You said..."). We may choose to begin an explanation with, "I'll 
answer you this way", give the explanation and then close with, "that's my 
response". However, these brackets need not come in pairs (Schiffrin, 1980). 
People often choose to signal only at the beginning, such as in "the only thing I 
want to say is..." or signal only at the end, as in "that's all I wanted to say". These 
brackets help the other know what we are doing.
Schiffrin (1980) notes that people often choose to label a segment of talk as 
in saying, "the point is..." or "for example...". Ragan (1983) identified one metatalk  
convention which functioned to simultaneously organize and label talk. Within her 
research she termed it agendizing. Specifically, she found that within job 
interviews people are inclined to say things such as "let me formally introduce 
myself" which set a specific agenda for the talk that was to follow.
Ragan (1983) also identified and coded several other functions of metatalk. 
Although she provides no information about how the categories were generated
14
and does not provide needed elaboration distinctions between categories, the 
functions she identifies are interesting. Metatalk can signal that a previous item is 
being cancelled or replaced and better talk is being suggested for consideration 
(Schiffrin, 1980). Ragan (1983) coded some talk into a category she termed 
clarify ing . This talk occurred in reference to one's own talk ("what I said was...") or 
the other's (“what do you mean when you say..."). These observations parallel 
Schiffrin's (1980) note that conversants often preface a repair or a request for a 
repair with metatalk.
One other of Ragan's (1983) categories merits discussion here. She labelled 
one category directing, in instances where messages masqueraded as asking 
permission to perform certain functions while actually performing those functions. 
People often say things such as "can I ask you a question?" As Ragan (1983) 
notes, these conventions are quite similar to what Schegloff (1980) deals with as 
"preliminaries to preliminaries". Schegloff explains that these devices serve to 
project what the speaker intends to do ("let me ask you something") or project 
what will be expected of the hearer ("listen to this"). Since the projected action 
usually does not occur within the same conversational turn as the "pre-pre", these 
forms of alignment talk help to supply the context for what is to come.
15
1.3.2.3 . evaluative m eta ta lk
In introducing this section it was stated that each of the categories of 
alignment talk cluster around how they are metacommunicative. This phrasing was 
chosen to indicate that each category is more of a "fuzzy set" than a mutually 
exclusive category. The following discussion describes two additional functions of 
alignment talk that are still within the cluster of basically housekeeping, 
metalinguistic alignment talk, but move farther away from the central axis of that 
cluster.
First, Schiffrin (1980) notes that metatalk often plays an evaluative role. 
These evaluative brackets move toward functioning on a relational level of 
meaning. Saying, "that's not the point" or "this is the main thing" helps organize 
the talk, but also may function to send an explicit relational message. Saying, 
"that is a lie" is metalinguistic in that it refers to the verbal properties of the 
previous utterance, but it also carries obvious relational overtones.
Second, within conversations people often evaluate talk in a more subtle 
manner than labeling it with an evaluative bracket. Conversants will frequently offer 
up summaries or gists of the talk so far. These naturally occurring summaries have 
been termed form ulations (Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970; Heritage & Watson, 1979). 
Formulations do not occur only at obviously problematic junctures in talk. It is just 
that communicators-
...may treat some part of the conversation as an occasion to describe that 
conversation, to explain it, or characterize it or explicate, or translate, or 
summarize or furnish the gist of it... (Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970, p. 350)
Formulations abstract the significant meanings within, or the general
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meaning of the conversation or some segment of the conversation. For example, 
one conversant might say, "...so you know you will get the (test) results back and 
you could get a job" (Heritage & Watson, 1979, p143) as a formulation of a 
preceeding, prolonged exchange about one party being currently unemployed and 
depressed. The formulation provides the gist of the conversation from one 
person's perspective by preserving the essential meaning while deleting 
unimportant information. Formulations also transform meanings somewhat, at least 
into different words (Heritage & Watson, 1979).
Based on Heritage and Watson's (1979) explanations, formulations are 
essentially articulations of what van Dijk (1980, 1981; also van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983) 
terms macrostructures. A macrostructure can be viewed as an overarching 
proposition or a global representation of discourse which develops in the mind of 
a communicator (McLaughlin, 1984). That is, we preserve summaries or general 
impressions of talk while not retaining the specific utterances. We might 
understand and recall that our boss "hassled" us without remembering exactly 
what was said to give us that impression. These macrostructures derive from  
actual utterances and all the bridging inferences, presuppositions and additions 
conversants make during comprehension (van Dijk, 1980; van Dijk 8i Kintsch, 1983). 
The significant difference between formulations and macrostructures is that van 
Dijk (1980, 1981) is concerned with discourse processing leading to comprehension 
and Garfinkel and Sacks (1970) and Heritage and Watson (1979) are concerned with  
the manifest content of a verbal convention.
Formulations are evaluative in that they provide the sense of the
17
conversation from one person's perspective. Obviously, there are a myriad of 
possible global interpretations that can be attached to any segment of talk. For 
instance, one might interpret an interaction as a playful argument while the other 
person involved is interpreting the same exchange as "being nagged". So one's 
formulation of the talk amounts to stating an opinion what has transpired. 
Formulations do not constitute once-and-for-a ll statements of th is -is -h o w -it-is  
(Heritage & Watson, 1979).
Heritage and Watson (1979) note that formulations generally conform t o ,  
adjacency pair structure (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1974). Adjacency pairs are 
types of utterances which normally occur together. Just as questions (the first pair 
part of the adjacency pair) generally elicit answers (the second pair part), or offers 
generally elicit responses, formulations generally elicit (and occur adjacent to) 
confirmations or rejections. Implicit in the adjacency pair structure is that when 
one speaker proffers the first pair part, the respondent's turn is constrained in that 
there is pressure to at least work toward providing the second pair part. 
Formulations perform alignment functions by providing one possible interpretation  
of the talk and giving the conversants a chance to negotiate, if necessary. 
Essentially, formulations mark occasions where conversants can check out each 
others' understandings.
The two alignment talk functions discussed immediately above do not fit 
neatly into the category of text centered, housekeeping alignment talk. Metatalk 
which brackets discourse in an evaluative manner does not play a purely 
housekeeping role since the evaluative brackets can be "loaded" with meanings at
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the relational level. Also, formulations can be viewed as playing more than a 
management role. It is argueable whether or not a formulation adds new content 
to a conversation since the formulation may include an explicit articulation of what 
had previously been only inferred. The novelty of the information within the 
formulation may depend on whether or not the inference was "correct".
1.3.2.4. Summary
The first subsection alignment talk has centered on the basically 
housekeeping, discourse centered metacommunicative functions of alignment talk 
as summarized in table 1-1. The alignment talk described thus far functions to 
clarify verbal meanings and direct communicators' attention to the utterances 
within the discourse at hand. Conversational repairs within side sequences are the 
simplest example of this type of alignment talk. Metatalk, or talk about talk, often 
functions to bracket or label talk. Schiffrin (1980) and Ragan (1980, 1983) both have 
identified and discussed different specific functions of metatalk. Moving slightly 
away from a clearly housekeeping function, metatalk can also bracket talk in an 
evaluative way. Formulations, which are essentially verbalizations of 
macrostructures, also evaluate talk and play an alignment role.
So speakers often attempt to stay in alignment by making references to the 
talk itself. These direct references help manage the conversation. Alignment talk 
from this perspective focuses on the discourse being created and the collaborative 
nature of achieving understanding within a conversation. Speakers are attempting 
to align their interpretations of the talk with the interpretations of the other 
conversants. A different perspective on alignment talk sees it functioning in 
another manner.
19
Table 1-1: Summary of Housekeeping Forms of Alignment Talk
Type of Talk Function Example
Conversational Conversants step outside 
Repairs of main sequence to
clarify a meaning
A: So, brewski?
B: Uh...what?
A: Do you want a beer? 
B: Oh, yeah sure.
Organizational Brackets or labels "The answer is, 1 did not aet
Metatalk discourse the information 1 needed.
th a t’s all."
Evaluative Brackets or labels "That’s earbasre, the truth is
Metatalk discourse in an 1 can come home anytime 1
evaluative manner want.that’s the important
thing."
1.3.3. Substantive Alignment Talk
Often, within conversations, people are concerned with more than staying in 
alignment with other conversants. They may also be concerned with some social 
rule (Scott & Lyman, 1968). For example, the executive who walks into a meeting  
twenty minutes late may offer an account by stating that no one had told her that 
the meeting time had been changed. That verbal convention recasts the event. The 
act of coming in late is explicitly redefined and the offender is cast as the 
innocent victim of misinformation. Subsequent interactions should take place in 
light of the identity defined in part by the alignment talk. Alignment talk in these
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situations is a direct and fairly explicit attempt to define the general episode and 
protect identities within the situation. This perspective on alignment talk has its 
conceptual roots in Austin's (1961) discussion of excuses, Goffman's (1967, 1971) 
work on remediation and Mills' (1940) essay on the vocabulary of motives. From 
this perspective of the symbolic interactionists in Sociology, alignment talk occurs 
when interactants become aware that their situational identities are threatened and 
they are in danger of being typified in a negative manner (Austin, 1961; Goffman, 
1971; Hewitt & Stokes, 1975; Scott & Lyman, 1968; Stokes 8t Hewitt, 1976).
Alignment talk serving to bring acts into alignment with social rules is 
conceptually similar to what occurs within Goffman's (1967) "corrective process". 
People engage in this corrective process in order to save face. Goffman (1971) 
later discusses these corrective interactions as remedial exchanges which have as 
their goal the transformation of meanings. These exchanges seek to transform  
what could be seen as offensive into what can be seen as acceptable (Goffman, 
1971).
Morris and Hopper (1980) note that alignment talk can also be legislative in 
nature. That is, talk can serve to establish how rules will be dealt with in the 
future. For example, a student may come into an instructor's office and state that 
he has not been in class because he was in a serious auto accident. Remediation 
may occur in that the student's behavior may now be redefined. He may not be 
seen as irresponsible for skipping class. Legislation may occur in that the two of 
them may decide that, in the future, a similar situation should be handled by the 
student having the doctor call the instructor. Thus, they have agreed about how  
the social rule "students should act responsibly" is to be managed.
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Alignment talk functioning in this manner does add new content to a 
conversation. That content is the negotiation of how an action is to be viewed in 
light of social rules. As Goffman states it: "ordinarily, maintenance of face is a 
condition of interaction, not its objective" (1967, p. 12). Substantive alignment talk 
occurs when facework is the objective of the talk.
1 .3 .3 .1 . accounts
Probably the prototype of alignment talk from this sociological perspective is 
the account (Scott & Lyman, 1968). An account is a statement, offerred 
retrospectively to recontextualize behavior when that behavior could possibly be 
seen as inappropriate. The executive who came in late in the example provided 
earlier, excused her behavior with an account. Essentially, accounts seek to 
reconstruct the context of an event (Austin, 1961; Buttny, 1985). The person 
offering the account makes a case for how the event should be taken, often by 
drawing upon unverifiable information such as intentions or previous events 
(Buttny, 1985).
Scott 8( Lyman (1968) distinguish accounts from explanations. Explanations 
are statements which elaborate on events where negative typification is not at 
issue. For instance, one might explain why one is having tea instead of coffee. In 
most circumstances others would not sanction us for deviating from the norm of 
having coffee in the morning. Accounts have critical implications for relationships 
and occur only when one has reason to fear that someone may be judging 
behaviors as socially inappropriate.
Originally, accounts were separated into two general categories: excuses and
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justifications (Austin, 1961; Scott & Lyman, 1968). Excuses admit the 
inappropriateness of the act in question but deny the actor should bear full 
responsibility (Austin, 1961; Scott 8» Lyman, 1968). One might state that they did 
indeed knock their spouse down the stairs, but only because they themselves 
slipped on a wet spot on the floor. A justification accepts full responsibility for 
the act but denies that any negative retypification should occur (Austin, 1961; 
Scott 8c Lyman, 1968; Sykes 8c Matza, 1957). Justifications claim that an act should 
be deemed appropriate in this particular context. Soldiers may justify killing 
because the victims are the enemy and deserve, even need to be killed.
Schonbach (1980) suggests two additional categories of accounts; 
concessions and refusals. He does not discuss these categories at any length, but 
does provide a taxonomy of subtypes within each category. Concessions consist of 
acknowledging the inappropriateness of the act in question and accepting the 
responsibility. A concession may include an expression of regret and a reference to 
compensation. We might say, "I know I was very rude last night. I'll make it up to 
you". A refusal is exactly the opposite of a concession. The accused party totally 
refutes that there is any need for an account from him. He may attribute  
responsibility to another person, deny the event took place or deny that the 
reproacher has any right to request an account. One might say, "there was no 
money stolen, besides it's none of your business what goes on around here."
Research on accounts indicates that conversants look to the content of the 
account as an indication of how the offender feels and as a cue for how to 
respond to the account. Cody and McLaughlin (1985) suggest two broad classes
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of factors which influence the choice of an account and the manner in which it is 
received. Based on three studies (Cody & McLaughlin, 1985; McLaughlin, Cody 8c 
O'Hair, 1983; McLaughlin, Cody 8c Rosenstein, 1983) they posit first an interactional 
factor based on an aggravation-mitigation hypothesis. That is, within accounting 
sequences, moves that are polite or mitigating elicit similar moves. Moves that are 
aggravating elicit aggravating responses. The second class of factors they present 
is the offending party's perceptions of the situation. Specifically, this category 
includes the offender's perception of the act in question and perception of the 
accounting sequence (severity of the offense, current goals), the feeling state of 
the offender (guilt, responsibility), the offender's perception of her relationship with 
the reproacher and the offender's perception of the reproacher (hostile, resistant).
Cody and McLaughlin (1985) draw some general conclusions regarding the 
factors they have identified and the factors' relationship with account types. In 
general, they conclude that when an offense is perceived as severe, if face 
maintenance goals are important, and/or the offender feels guilty, the account is 
likely to be a concession or an excuse. When the offender feels less guilty and 
relational goals are unimportant, then a refusal or silence is most likely.
Cody and McLaughlin's (1985) aggravation-m itgation hypothesis is supported 
by Blumstein's (1974) finding that the amount of pentinence within an account is 
the best predictor of whether or not an account will be honored. That is, he found 
that an account indicating a great deal of remorse, having a generally mitigating 
effect, was most effective in eliciting a mitigating evaluation of the account and 
bringing the account sequence to a close.
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Shields (1979) tested the effects of accounts along with perceived status and 
eye contact on subject's ratings of a stimulus person's responsibility, credibility 
and remorsefulness. Not surprisingly, she found people are perceived as more 
remorseful when proffering an excuse than when offering a justification or no 
account at all. In fact, she found that justifying and offering no account at all are 
perceived in much the same way.
Shields' (1979) results indicated accounts have no significant effect on 
perceptions of responsibility. Subjects perceived the stimulus person to be equally 
responsible for the act in question regardless of whether or not an account was 
offered or the type of account, if present. From this she concludes that accounts 
have minimal effect on transforming the meaning of an event. It should be noted 
that Shields' (1979) test involved subjects viewing a videotape of a stimulus person 
confessing to stealing a lighter from a jewelery store. The excuse condition was 
based on the thief saying he had had a few beers and was embarassed to return 
the lighter after the clerk had seen him use it. Another, more reasonable excuse, 
perhaps saying he put the lighter in his pocket by force of habit after using it, may 
have relieved more responsibility.
Ragan and Hopper (1981) and Ragan (1983) conducted two studies aimed at 
identifying the function of alignment talk within job interviews. They conclude that 
alignment talk serves to help establish and preserve the differential roles of the 
interviewer and the applicant. Overall, it was the applicant that provided very 
nearly all of the accounts. Often, the applicant would provide accounts that 
disclosed negative information even when an account was not called for. Ragan
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and Hopper (1981) state that the overwhelming number of accounts offered by the 
applicants is indicative of their lower status.
1.3.3.2. disclaimers
People will often address problematic events before they actually happen. 
Disclaimers (Hewitt 81 Stokes, 1975) function in much the same way as accounts, 
but are offered prospectively. Goffman (1971) discusses the same notion briefly, 
calling them requests. He notes people often ask license of a potentially offended 
party. Disclaimers (the more common term) pre-contextualize in that they indicate 
awareness of a rule before it is violated, whereas accounts re-contextualize an act 
after it appears a rule has been violated. One example of a disclaimer would be in 
saying, "I don't mean to be rude but..." Disclaimers "define the future in the 
present, creating interpretations of potentially problematic events intended to make 
them unproblematic when they occur" (Hewitt 8t Stokes, 1975, p. 2).
As Hewitt and Stokes (1975) state, the use of disclaimers is significant in that 
it indicates that actors know their words and deeds serve as a basis for typifying 
them. We use disclaimers in order to have input into how the other will typify us. 
Disclaimers often call the other's attention to a specific undesirable interpretation 
and asks them not to make that interpretation (Hewitt & Stokes, 1975). For 
instance, a conversant may use what Hewitt and Stokes (1975) call a hedge to  
signal minimal commitment to a statement, as in, "I'm no expert but..." The hedge 
admits not being an expert and essentially asks the hearer not to think negatively 
of the speaker for trying to sound like one. Credentialing, such as in, ''I have a lot 
of Jewish friends and..." signals a strong commitment to a statement. It tells the 
hearer she should not judge the speaker for not knowing what he is talking about.
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Hewitt and Stokes (1975) also identify three other forms of disclaimers. Sin 
licenses are used when a speaker knows the forthcoming utterance will be 
inappropriate in some manner and the speaker wants to make it known he is 
aware of the rule. In a sense, sin licenses pay homage to rules. We might say, "I 
know I'm out of line here..." in an attempt to invoke the general principle that all 
rules may occasionally be broken. By doing this we preserve our identity as a rule 
abiding person. We use cognitive disclaimers to let others know we are in touch 
with the same reality they are. We say, "I know this sounds crazy..." to let hearers 
know the following utterance may not seem to fit in at first hearing. Finally, an 
appeal for the suspension of judgement asks others to wait before typifying us at 
all. For example, we say, "Hear me out before you explode..."
Disclaimers, for the most part, have been studied in conjunction with other 
verbal conventions rather than specifically as a category of alignment talk. They 
have usually been tested as one component of "powerless speech". Bradley (1981) 
for example, had confederates use disclaimers along with tag questions ("that's 
right, isn't it?") to operationalize a variable she termed qualifiers. She found women 
are perceived less positively and function less influentially when they frequently 
use qualifiers.
Warfel (1984) used disclaimers in the form of hedges, along with qualifiers 
("kind of", "I guess"), compound questions ("won't you please close the door?") and 
tag questions to characterize a powerless speech style. By including all four 
components, the speech style ostensibly expresses tentativeness, uncertainty and 
lack of assertiveness. In evaluating subjects' ratings of a transcribed conversation,
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she found speakers using the powerless style to be rated as less dominant but 
more competent than a speaker using a generic style. Further analysis of her data 
provided no satisfactory explanation for why speakers using the less powerful style 
should be viewed as more competent.
Other studies of speech style often use a form which they label hedges in 
operationalizing a powerless speech style (Bradac, Hemphill & Tardy, 1981; Bradac 
& Mulac, 1984; Erickson, Lind, Johnson & O'Barr, 1978; Newcombe & Arnkoff, 1979). 
However, hedges of the form used in these studies do not conform to Hewitt and 
Stokes' (1975) definition of a disclaimer. Typically, the hedges used in speech style 
research are in the form of "I sort of" and "I kinda" (Bradac & Mulac, 1984) or "you 
know" and "kinda" (Newcombe 8t Arnkoff, 1979). In this usage, hedges are simply 
phrases which blunt definiteness. They are not syntactically or functionally 
disclaimers.
Bell, Zahn and Hopper (1984) provide a study centered on disclaimers as well 
as some insightful criticism of methodologies used by language researchers. They 
note that many studies, particularly Bradley (1981) and Erickson et al. (1978) 
operationalize the powerless speech style in such a way as to produce a "hammer 
effect". That is, the speech segments provided as stimulus materials contain an 
unrealistic amount of the powerless features, essentially hammering the subjects 
and producing significant effects.
Bell et al.'s original test of disclaimers produced no significant effects on 
subjects' ratings of speakers' competence, certainty or character. The researchers 
tested the use of hedges and cognitive disclaimers independently and used
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together. They used only one form of the disclaimer embedded in conversations 
approximately 150 words in length. In a second study, they found that increasomg 
the number of disclaimers to four or six within a 150 word transcript would 
produce significant ratings on all measures, thus, the hammer effect hypothesis. 
These tests led Bell et al. (1984) to conclude that past literature has 
overemphasized the importance of the role of disclaimers in person perception.
However, Bell and colleagues (1984) may have expected their disclaimers to 
do too much. Their stimulus transcript was of a conversation between an 
instructor and a student. The manipulated exchange has the student saying, "the 
syllabus is trash". The researchers manipulated the content by inserting a 
disclaimer in from t of the "trash" statement. Simply saying, "this is just my 
opinion" (the hedge) or "this may sound absurd" (the cognitive disclaimer) may not 
be powerful enough to override the loaded connotations of telling a professor a 
syllabus is trash. In extending the idea that disclaimers can reframe coming words 
to make them more acceptable, no theorist would contend that a disclaimer can 
totally pre-contextualize any act into appropriateness. If that were the case, 
simply saying, "I'm no thief, but give me all your money" would guarantee financial 
security. Bell et al. (1984) could have constructed a more realistic scenario by 
using less "loaded" language.
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1.3.3.3. Summary
To summarize this general perspective, alignment talk can function to impact 
on the context of an act. The alignment talk often functions to transform the 
meaning of an act from potentially discrediting to acceptable. Accounts transform  
meanings retrospectively by re-contextualizing an event. Disclaimers function 
prospectively, defining the future in the present. The basic categories and functions 
of substantive alignment talk is summarized in table 1-2.
Table 1-2: Summary of Substantive Forms of Alignment Talk
Type of Talk Function Example
Accounts Recontextualizes an act,
functioning retrospectively, in 
light of social rules
"Sure I've been drinking, 
today is my birthday 
and 1 just passed 
my orals".
Disclaimers Precontextualizes an act in
light of social rules, 
functioning prospectively.
"Don't get me wrong, 
I like  vou. 1 iust 
need more time  
to myself."
Some research on accounts indicates that the level of mitigation within the 
account influences the interaction. Within job interviews, the use of accounts helps 
preserve the roles of the people involved. Researchers have usually used 
disclaimers only as one component of a powerless speech style. Some language 
research which has produced significant effects may be guilty of "hammering" 
subjects with unrealistic doses of low power conventions. Finally, Bell et al. (1984) 
may have sabotaged their study on disclaimers by using loaded language.
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1.4. GENERAL SUMMARY AND HYPOTHESES
The literature on inference making in conversations illustrates how people 
regularly come to understandings well beyond what is coded linguistically. On 
both a content level, as with simple bridging inferences, and on a relational level 
of meaning, such as in interpreting speech acts, we regularly "fill in the blanks".
Alignment talk represents our verbal efforts to help others understand us as 
we wish to be understood. That people use talk to help understand one another is 
not a surprising insight What is at issue here is: When we use these alignment 
conventions, do they impact on the relationship being negotiated in any regular 
manner? There is actually little known about what, if anything, the use of alignment 
talk signals about the relationships being defined through the talk.
Scholars note that the relationship between messages and context is 
reflexive. The context, including the relationships, provides valuable cues as to 
how a message should be interpreted, while the messages themselves are helping 
to create the context. This study seeks to identify some of the subtle contributions 
to context some linguistic conventions may carry. With this in mind, this study 
operates under the guidance of one overriding research question:
R1-Does alignment talk lead hearers to make inferences about the 
alignment talk user? If so, on what dimensions does the alignment talk 
impact, and in what direction?
The literature identifies a number of types of alignment talk. Basically, the 
category of housekeeping alignment talk consists of organizational metatalk and 
evaluative metatalk. Within the general category of substantive alignment talk are 
accounts and disclaimers. For this exploratory study, one form of each type of
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housekeeping alignment talk was tested. Additionally, one mitigating form of 
account and one aggrevating form of account was tested as were tw o forms of 
disclaimers.
To identify types of inferences hearers make based on alignment talk, the 
literature provides some direction in identifying dimensions of effects language has 
shown on hearers. Mulac's (1976) Revised Speech Dialect Attitude Scale (RSDAS) 
has established three dimensions to be psychologically real: socio-intellectual
status, aesthetic quality and dynamism. Also, Shellen and Bach (1983) found native 
language users to judge language along the two dimensions of empathic/friendly  
and dominant/assertive. Mulac's (1976) factors indicate hearers' evaluations of the 
speaker and the dimensions identified by Shellen and Bach (1983) are aimed more 
at evaluations of the language itself.
The literature on metatalk is largely descriptive. Schiffrin (1980) has noted 
that metatalk serves to organize, label and evaluate messages. Other research 
(Ragan 8( Hopper, 1980; Ragan, 1983) has described how metatalk functions to 
differentiate and support power and status differences within job interviews. One 
particular convention, agendizing, is an excellent example of organizational 
metatalk since it functions to both bracket and label talk. From the perspective of 
this study, the question is: Does the use of agendizing in informal conversation 
signal status and power? If agendizing inherently impacts on context as expected, 
the following hypothesis should hold true:
H1-Conversants using the metatalk convention agendizing will be viewed 
as the more dominant and more dynamic speaker, and will be perceived 
as having higher status.
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Dominance can be viewed as the assertion of interpersonal control (see 
Burgoon & Hale, 1984; Parks, 1977; Rogers-Millar & Millar, 1979). A communicator 
will be seen as dominant if the definition of the relationship asserted by the 
communicator's message is accepted by the other, submissive communicator. In 
general, a dominant communicator is seen as powerful, controlling and influential.
Dynamism reflects the speaker's liveliness and energy level (Burgoon & Hale, 
1984). Specifically, this dimension is a combination of the traditional factors of 
potency and activity (Mulac, Hanley Prigge, 1974).
Status of the speaker is measured along Mulac's (1976) factor of socio­
intellectual status. This can be viewed as reflecting the communicator's level of 
education and socio-economic status..
The formulation is an excellent representative form of evaluative metatalk. 
Formulations are evaluative in that they provide a summary of the talk so far from  
the speaker's perspective. Within the job interview context, interviewers used 
significantly more formulations than applicants, reflecting the interviewers' 
dominance and higher status. If formulations signal higher status and dominance, 
the following hypothesis should hold true:
H2-Conversants using formulations will be viewed as more dominant, 
more dynamic and perceived as having higher status.
The substantive forms of alignment talk refer to events outside of the talk. 
Accounts function retrospectively to make an act more acceptable in light of social 
rules. The interview research documents accounts functioning to distinguish a 
submissive, low status role. Other studies focusing on accounting sequences
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conclude that the level of mitigation within an account can impact on the 
interaction. This leads to the third hypothesis:
H3-Conversants providing highly mitigating accounts will be seen as 
more friendly and less dominant than those offering more aggravating 
accounts. All account users will be seen as less dominant and of lower 
status than conversants not using accounts.
The friendliness dimension of rating can be conceptualized as the impression 
of how kind or nice the conversant is perceived to be. This would be similar to 
what Hart and Brown (1974) termed benevolence information.
As recommended by Cody and McLaughlin (1985), this study employs 
subtypes of the account categories since each subtype may vary in level of 
mitigation. Specifically, as a highly mitigating account, this study uses a subtype 
of excuse provided by Schonbach (1980), an appeal to one's own effort and care 
before and during the failure event. As an aggravating account this research uses a 
subtype of justification identified by Scott and Lyman (1968), a denial of injury.
The second form of substantive alignment talk, the disclaimer, has been 
assumed to signal powerlessness when used with other verbal conventions. 
Research focusing on disclaimers has concluded that their role in affecting person 
perception has been overemphasized, although that research may have been 
methodologically flawed. In the original literature on disclaimers, Hewitt and Stokes 
(1975) state that hedging signals tentativeness and lack of commitment to a 
statement while credentialing signals a strong commitment to a statement. These 
claims lead to the fourth and final hypothesis:
H4-Conversants using a disclaimer in the form of a hedge will be 
perceived as less dynamic and less dominant than a conversant using a
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disclaimer in the form of credentialing. All conversants using any form of 
disclaimer will be perceived as more friendly than conversants not using 
disclaimers.
Chapter 2
METHODS 
2.1. SUBJECTS
Subjects were seventy undergraduate students enrolled in an introductory 
Communication class. All subjects were volunteers and all were native speakers of 
English.
2.2. MATERIALS
A total of six different types of alignment talk were tested using written  
transcriptions of conversations. The test materials were designed to control for 
methodological errors common in language research. First, multiple examples of 
each type of talk were tested. For example, in testing for the effects of hedging, 
five distinctly different examples of hedges were composed and tested. By using 
five examples of each type of alignment talk, the design safeguarded against the 
common error of generalizing about message categories based on only a single 
instance of that category (Jackson & Jacobs, 1983). Also, to control for the effects 
of the content of the conversation surrounding the alignment talk, each type of 
alignment talk was tested within five different conversations. The conversation 
surrounding the alignment talk was held consistent for each test condition.
The result of assembling materials in the manner described was that the 
subjects within each condition (talk type) rated five different examples of the same
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type of alignment talk within five different conversations. All subjects rated the 
same five basic conversations with only the alignment talk being manipulated. One 
group of subjects evaluated a control version of the conversations which contained 
no alignment talk.
Each conversational segment was approximately ten lines long. Written 
scenarios of this length have been effectively used in a number of language 
studies (Bradac & Mulac, 1984; Warfel, 1984; Erickson et al., 1978). In general,
written transcripts are believed to effectively safeguard against cues other than
language, such as delivery idiosynchracies or gender of the speaker which might 
affect subjects' ratings (Bradac 8t Mulac, 1984, Callary, 1974). Both Erickson et al.
(1978) and Mulac (1976) found ratings of written scenarios did not differ
significantly from ratings of audio tapes when testing language variables. All test 
scenarios as presented to subjects are displayed in Appendix A.
2.2.1. The Conversations
All test scenarios were presented without speaker names. An A: or a B: 
proceeded each line to indicate a change of speaker. This was done to eliminate 
gender or ethnic cues which names may have given the subjects.
Conversation 1 was an altered version of one of the test transcripts used by 
Beil et al. (1984). It is a conversation between a student and an instructor about 
absences. In conversation 2, tw o students discuss a class project and a third 
person not present. Number 3 depicts two students meeting in a classroom for the 
first time. Conversation 4 is a conversation between two students who have just 
finished with a class. Number 5 has two students discussing the importance of 
grades.
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Care was taken to keep the test conversations identical across treatments 
except for the stimulus lines. This was not always possible to do while 
simultaneously striving for naturalness in stimulus messages as suggested by 
Jackson and Jacobs (1983). Slight variations in the conversations were sometimes 
necessary and will be noted below. Also in line with the suggestions of Jackson 
and Jacobs (1983), each example of alignment talk was composed with an eye 
toward prototypicality. That is, each stimulus line was designed to be a clear cut 
example of its category.
Within the general category of substantive alignment talk, tw o types of talk 
are identified in the literature, disclaimers and accounts. Two types of disclaimers 
were tested. Hedges, as defined by Hewitt and Stokes (1975), signal tentativeness 
and a general lack of commitment to a forthcoming utterance. All five examples of 
hedging were written to indicate that the speaker was unsure about, and not 
committed to, the forthcoming statement. Credentialing, the second type of 
disclaimer tested, is just the opposite of hedging. In these examples the speaker 
signals a strong commitment to the upcoming utterance and cites some factor 
which gives the speaker the right to make the remark that follows. All the stimulus 
line examples of hedging and credentialing are displayed in table 2 -1 .
Accounts are a type of substantive alignment talk offerred in order to bring 
some action in line with some social rule. Cody and McLaughlin (1985) have noted 
that accounts often vary in their degree of mitigation and aggravation. Two types 
of accounts were tested. Five examples were composed to be highly aggravating. 
They were written to fit into what Schonbach (1980) lists as a denial of damage. A
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Table 2-1: Summary of Disclaimers as Tested
Type of Talk Stimulus Line
Hedging Scene 1 -"This is just my opinion, but the syllabus
isn't clear about absences."
Scene 2-" l  haven't known Chris fo r  very  long a t all, 
but I think it's just lack of intelligence. Chris 
just hasn't got it."
Scene 2- “Vve never had this p ro f before, but I think 
this class is going to be boring."
Scene 4 -"Fve never had a class in this departm ent 
before, but I don't think they care if we get 'em 
back or not."
Scene 5-" /  haven't researched the job m arket yet, 
but I think it depends on the job, really."
Credentialing Scene 1 -" I’ve read the syllabus very  carefu lly ,
and the syllabus isn't clear about absences."
Scene 2-" W ell, I ’ve known Chris p re tty  w ell fo r  a 
long tim e, it's just lack of intelligence. Chris 
just hasn't got it."
Scene 3-" I’ve had classes from  this prof before, this 
class is going to be boring."
Scene 4-"M y  room m ate has had a lo t o f classes in 
this departm ent, they don't care if we get 'em back 
or not."
Scene 5 -"W ell my brother works in personnel fo r  a 
big corporation, I think it depends on the job, 
really."
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denial of damage is a subcategory of a justification. In each of the justifications 
the speaker accepts the responsibility for the act in question, but implies that no 
negative typification should occur under the present circumstances. Five other 
examples were written to be highly mitigating and to fit what Schonbach (1980) 
lists as an appeal to ones own effort and care before and during the failure event. 
This is a subcategory of an excuse. Each example sought to present factors which 
would exempt the speaker from being fully responsible for the failure event. All the 
test examples of accounts are displayed in table 2 -2 .
Within the general category of housekeeping alignment talk, some metatalk is 
largely organizational while other conventions bracket discourse in an evaluative 
manner. In order to test the effects of organizational metatalk, five examples of 
agendizing were composed and tested. Agendizing is metatalk that sets a specific 
agenda for the discourse to follow. All examples of agendizing were written to 
specify the topic of the talk that followed. In three of the agendizing test 
scenarios (scenes 1, 2 and 4) it was necessary to insert an additional turn for each 
speaker. This additional turn consisted of the agendizing remark and a response 
(see appendix A).
To operational!ze the variable of evaluative metatalk, five examples of 
formulations were composed and tested. The examples of formulating were written  
to express one speaker's understanding of the talk that had gone on before. In one 
version of formulating (scene 2) it was necessary to insert an additional turn for 
each speaker consisting of the formulation an a response.
Both agendizing and formulating were noted by Ragan (1983) to be used
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Table 2-2: Summary of Accounts as Tested
Type of Account Stimulus Lines
Aggravating Scene 1-"IVIo I didn't. I missed those two days you went over
Justification the test. I aced that exam so I didn't need to be there."
Scene 2-'T m  almost done. This paper is only 10% of our grade and 
that instructor will always take them late, so it doesn't matter."
Scene 3-"Oh. I haven't bought the book yet. Sometimes the profs 
only test you over the lecture material. A lot of books are 
really a waste of money. I can always get it later."
Scene 4 -" l didn't go. Studying in a group is a waste of time.
They just go over w hat we did in class. Those sessions just 
confuse me.”
Scene 5-" l don't even know. I don’t worry about it, you're 
supposed to have fun in college. Employers look more at your 
special skills than GPA."
Mitigating Scene 1-"N o  I didn't. I made sure to check in to the Health
Excuse Center when I got sick, so there'd be a record,. I called your
office, but I couldn't get a note."
Scene 2-"l'm  almost done. I've been working real hard on it. 
I've been budgeting my tim e and talking to the instructor 
about it every day."
Scene 3-"Oh. I haven't bought the book yet. I talked to the 
book store and they have one on hold for me. I made sure to 
get the money out of the bank today."
Scene 4 -''l didn't go. I marked the dates and times on my 
calender and I had the study sheets, but I never made it."
Scene 5~"l don't even know. I work hard in my classes. 
I try to get good grades all the time but I don't know  
w hat my GPA is."
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almost exclusively by the high power, high status speaker (the interviewer) within a 
job interview context. All examples of housekeeping alignment talk as tested are 
displayed in table 2-3.
Table 2-3: Summary of Housekeeping Alignment Talk as Tested
Category of Talk Form of Talk Stimulus Line
Organizational Agendizing Scene 1- T d  like for us to discuss absences."
Metatalk
Scene 2-"Let me tell you the reason for 
Chris's troubles."
Scene 3-"Let me form ally introduce myself."
Scene 4-"Oh. I need to tell you tw o things."
Scene 5-'*Let's talk about grades. You 
figuring out your grade point average?"
Evaluative Formulating Scene 1-"S o  you won't make any exceptions
M etatalk about absences. I think it's not fair."
Scene 2-"Then you agree w ith me about 
Chris."
Scene 3-"Oh, you're all ready to begin 
the quarter."
Scene 4-"Vou think you did well, then."
Scene 5~"0h, so grades are your top priority."
42
2.2.2. The Test Booklets
Test booklets were assembled containing five pages of test materials. For 
each condition, the order of the pages was randomized for two versions of the 
booklet. The order of the pages was rotated thereafter. The result being that no 
two subjects within the same cell received the pages in the same order. After all 
the booklets were assembled, the order of the booklets was randomized to be 
distributed to the subjects.
2.2.3. The Dependent Measure
The dependent measure used in this study combined two dependent 
measures from other research. Subjects' impressions of the conversations were 
measured using 22 seven-point likert type scales. The scales used had previously 
been demonstrated to load on five factors (Mulac, 1976; Shellen & Bach, 1983). 
Specifically, the dependent measure used in this study contained all 12 scales from  
Mulac's (1976) RSDAS which had shown to consistently load on three distinct 
factors, socio-intellectual status, dynamism and aesthetic quality. The aesthetic 
quality factor is not included in any of the hypotheses but was retained in order to 
help retain the validity of the other Mulac (1976) factors. The dependent measure 
of this research also utilized 11 scales from the language study done by Shellen 
and Bach (1983). Five of those scales had previously loaded onto an em pathic- 
friendly factor with six scales loading onto a dominant-assertive factor. The total 
number of scales worked out to be 22 because one scale (strong/weak) appeared 
within both the RSDAS and the measure used by Shellen and Bach (1983). A
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complete listing of all scales used and the factors on which they had previously 
loaded is provided in table 2-4.
Subjects' ratings were not made in the standard manner on the likert scales. 
One set of scales was presented immediately below each conversational scenario. 
Subjects were instructed to rate both conversants (A and B) on the same set of 
scales. They did this by placing an A or a B on the blank of the likert scale that 
best represented their impression of each speaker (Full instructions as read by the 
subjects appear in Appendix B). For an example, a rating on one scale may have 
appeared as follows.
Submissive Dominant
This rating would indicate conversant A to be more submissive than 
conversant B (or B to be more dominant).
This method Of rating was used for two reasons. First, it was hoped that by 
having the subjects place ratings of both speakers on the same line, they would 
think more in terms of conversants' relationship to one another, rather than rating 
them according to some unknown absolute criteria. This study is mostly concerned 
with comparisons between speakers within a conversation. Second, the length of 
the measurement instrument was reduced considerably, and hopefully the  
likelihood of subject fatigue was also reduced. A small pilot study revealed that 
subjects had no trouble understanding this method of rating. Random posttest 
interviews after the pilot study also indicated no confusion about the methods of 
rating and no indication the instrument was too long.
Within the dependent measure, scales were placed in random order and the
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Table 2-4: Summary of Scales Presented on Dependent Measures
Source: Mulac's RSDAS
Factor of Origin Scales Presented
Socio-intellectual status high social status-low
social status
w hite collar-b lue collar
rich-poor
litera te -illite ra te
Aesthetic quality pleasing-displeasing
nice-aw ful
sw eet-sour
beautiful-ugly
Dynamism aggressive-unaggressive
active-passive
strong-w eak
loud-soft
Source: Shellen and Bach
Factor of Origin Scales Presented
Empathic-Friendly harsh-gentle
hostile-friendly
abusive-com plim entary
compassionate-cruel
unfeeling-em pathic
sensitive-insensitive
Dominant-Assertive assertive-shy
w eak-strong
strong w illed -w ishy washy
decisive-indecisive
submissive-dom inant
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polarization of scales was alternated. The final version of the rating scales as 
presented to the subjects is displayed in Appendix C.
2.3. PROCEDURES
The order of the test booklets was randomized and distributed to the 
volunteer subjects in their classrooms during their regular class times. The 
subjects were told by the author he needed help on research being conducted on 
conversations. They were told to volunteer only if English was their native 
language and only if they had not participated in the pilot study.
2.4. ANALYSIS
Prior to statistical analysis the ratings provided by the subjects were 
subjected to factor analysis to determine the validity of the five factors presumed 
to be present in the dependent measure. The analysis proceeded using the factors 
extracted at this step.
The data were analyzed using a 5 x 7 (conversational scenario x alignment 
talk type) MANOVA with repeated measures on the second factor. Significant 
results for the seven talk conditions, the five scenarios or any interactions were 
analyzed further using post-hoc comparisons.
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Chapter 3 
RESULTS
3.1. Introduction
The data for this research reflected 70 subjects' evaluations of seven types 
of talk (hedging, credentialing, a mitigating excuse, an aggravating justification, 
agendizing, formulating and a control version) on 22 seven point likert type scales. 
Subjects evaluated both speakers within five different scenarios. Predictions were 
made along 4 different dimensions: dominance, friendliness, dynamism and status.
The dependent measure used in this study combined two measures never 
before used together. A factor analysis of the data was conducted first to see if 
the five factors which had previously been obtained from the dependent measures 
independently were present in this data.
Two separate MANOVAs were computed in testing the hypotheses. First, a 
MANOVA was computed to analyze the differences between the ratings of the 
alignment talk user and the speaker not using alignment talk. Since subjects rated 
both speakers together on the same line of each scale, this analysis was computed 
to see if a particular talk type caused the speakers to appear more polarized in 
some manner.
A second MANOVA was computed analyzing only the ratings of the 
alignment talk user. This analysis revealed subjects' changes in perceptions of a 
speaker based on that speaker's language choices alone.
47
In ail cases where the MANOVA revealed statistical significance, a 
subsequent univariate analysis was done to ascertain on which variables the 
significance was occurring. Finally, Tukey's Comparisons test was used to find out 
exactly which groups differed significantly.
3.2. Factor Analysis and Reliability
In order to assess the internal consistency of the rating scales the data 
gathered from the test booklets were subjected to varimax factor analysis with 
orthogonal rotation. The analysis revealed three distinct factors emerging rather 
than the total of five factors which had been expected. The three factors revealed 
the following dimensions of evaluation by subjects: (1) a niceness factor 
represented by 11 scales, (2) a dominance factor represented by 7 scales and (3) a 
social status factor represented by 3 scales. All but one of the scales, 
literate/illiterate, were represented by clear unambiguous loadings on the factors.
Within the niceness factor, 4 scales which had previously loaded together on 
what Mulac (1976) termed an aesthetic quality factor, covaried with 6 scales from  
Shellen and Bach's (1980) em pathy-friendly factor. The soft-loud scale from  
Mulac's (1976) dynamism factor also loaded onto the niceness factor. Additionally, 
2 scales from Mulac's (1976) dynamism factor combined with the 5 scales of 
Shellen and Bach's (1980) dominant-assertive factor. Three of the scales from  
Mulac's (1976) socio-intellectual factor loaded together on the third factor, social 
status. Table 3-1  shows the rotated factor loadings for all 22 scales presented to 
subjects.
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Table 3-1: Rotated Factor Loadings for All Scales
Scale Factor 1 
Niceness
Factor II 
Dominance
Factor III 
Social Status
sensitive/insensitive .71* -.06 .01
strong/weak .01 .69* .11
active/passive .08 .64* .06
strong-w illed/w ishy-washy .15 .71* .00
complimentary/abusive .73* -.01 .06
gentle/harsh .79* -.10 .00
sweet/sour .75* -.01 .09
beautiful/ugly .49* .04 .12
compassionate/cruel .82* -.08 .00
literate/illiterate .29 .35 .32
white collar/ .06 .06 .63*
blue collar
soft/loud .68* -.18 -.08
aggressive/ -.27 .62* .04
unaggressive
friendly/hostile .75* .04 -.01
assertive/shy -.15 .68* .07
nice/awful .78* -.03 .12
high social class/ .09 .16 .78*
low social class
rich/poor -.02 .07
*o00
dominant/submissive -.23 .71* .06
pleasing/displeasing .79* .01 .05
decisive/indecisive .00 .70* .09
empathic/unfeeling .80* -.03 .03
ind icates scale representative of the factor
Cronbach's Coefficient Alpha was calculated for each factor to determine 
their reliability. The niceness factor showed an internal consistency of .85. The 
dominance factor showed an internal consistency of .81 and the final factor, status, 
showed an internal consistency of .61.
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3.3. Analysis of Variance
A 5x7 multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was computed to  
determine the influence of the talk type and the scenario on subjects' evaluations 
of the speakers. Of interest in this research was the subjects' ratings of the tw o  
speakers relative to one another. Therefore, initially a MANOVA was computed 
analyzing the mean differences between the ratings of each speaker on each 
factor. That is, the data entered into the MANOVA were averages of the subjects' 
ratings of the alignment talk user minus their ratings of the speaker not using 
alignment talk. For example, a score of 1.0 within this data set would indicate that 
the alignment talk user was rated a full 1 point higher on the factor being judged 
than the other speaker in that same scenario. A score of -1 .0  would indicate that 
the speaker not using alignment talk had been rated higher on that particular 
variable. No significant differences were indicated for the main effect due to talk 
type (Wilk's lamda=.695, F[ 18,173]= 1.32, p=.18) or for the interaction between talk 
type and scenario (Wilk's lambda=281, F[72,289]= 1.05, p=.37). A complete display of 
cell means and standard deviations is shown in Appendix D, tables 1 to 3.
Another MANOVA was computed to analyze subjects' ratings of the 
alignment talk user only, regardless of their rating of the other speaker. In this 
analysis no significant difference was found for the interaction between talk type 
and scenario (Wilk's lambda=.292, F[72,289]=1.02, p=.45). This MANOVA did yield 
statistical significance for the main effect of talk type (Wilk's lambda=.581. 
F[18,173]=2.04, p<.01).
Univariate analysis confirmed the multivariate result of a significant main
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effect for talk type. A significant value was obtained for talk type on the 
dominance variable (F[6,63]=3.02, p<.01, eta squared=.055). The univariate results 
for niceness {F[6,63]=2.01, p=.08) and for status (F[6,63]=1.12, p=.36) were not 
statistically significant.
Tukey's comparisons showed that speakers using the alignment talk 
convention agendizing were rated significantly higher in dominance (mean=4.78) 
than speakers using the convention of hedging (mean=4.12) or a mitigating excuse 
(mean=4.12). No other group comparisons met the critical difference test. Group 
means and standard deviations for the ratings of the alignment talk user are 
displayed in table 3 -2 . A complete display of cell means and standard deviations is 
shown in Appendix D, tables 4 to 6.
Table 3-2: Means and Standard Deviations of Alignment Talk User
By Talk Type
Talk Type Niceness Dominance Status
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Hedging 4.19 .94 4.12a .91 4.13 .95
Credentialing 4.18 .87 4.42 .89 4.11 .70
Aggravating Justification 3.56 .91 4.41 .95 4.08 .82
Mitigating Excuse 3.70 1.07 4.12a 1.08 3.90 .93
Agendizing 3.71 1.26 4.78b 1.10 3.79 1.04
Formulating 3.73 1.09 4.61 1.08 4.36 1.14
Control 4.00 .79 4.21 .70 4.09 .69
Means subscripted a, differ significantly from  means subscripted b.
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Both the intial MANOVA using the mean differences in ratings and the 
MANOVA analyzing only the ratings of the speaker using alignment talk produced 
statistical significance on the main effect of conversational scenario. The MANOVA 
using the differences in the speakers yielded a Wilk's lambda of .575, 
F( 12,662)= 12.83, pc.OOO. The second MANOVA, using only the ratings of the 
speaker using alignment talk, yielded a Wilk's lambda of .605, F(12,662)=11.54, 
pc.OOO.
Again, univariate analysis confirmed the multivariate results. Univariate 
analysis of the differences in ratings produced significant results on the niceness 
variable (F[4,252]=25.24, pc.OOO) and the dominance variable (F[4,252]= 16.42, 
pc.OOO). The results on the status variable were statistically nonsignificant 
(F[4,252]=.556. p=.70).
Tukey's comparisons test revealed which scenarios differed significantly. For 
the niceness variable, the comparisons revealed the alignment talk user to be rated 
significantly higher than the other speaker within the scenario in scenario 3 
(mean=.85) than in scenario 1 (mean= -.34), scenario 2 (mean= -1 .02),scenario 
4(mean= -1 .25  and scenario 5 (mean= -.34). Also, scenario 5 varied significantly 
from scenarios 2 and 4 (see Appendix A for all versions of each numbered 
scenario). In other words, when using the differences in ratings as a gauge of the 
relationship being portrayed within the scenarios, some scenarios were perceived 
as portraying distinctly different relationships than others. The means and 
standard deviations for the differences data, grouped by scenario, are displayed in 
table 3 -3 .
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Table 3-3: Means and Standard Deviations For the Difference Between Alignment
Talk User and Speaker Not Using Alignment Talk By Scenario
Conversational Scenario Niceness Dominance Status
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Scenario 1 -.75ac 1.09 -2 3 e 1.50 .01 .99
Scenario 2 -1.02ac 1.33 .40eg 1.49 -.14 1.20
Scenario 3 ,85b 1.98 -6 0 e h 1.49 -.31 1.82
Scenario 4 -1.25ac 1.45 28eg .98 -.21 1.04
Scenario 5 -.34ad 1.22 -1 .32 f 1.67 -.16 1.64
Means subscripted a, d iffer significantly from mean subscripted b.
Means subscripted c, d iffer significantly from mean subscripted d.
Means subscripted e. d iffer significantly from mean subscripted f.
Means subscripted g, differ significantly from mean subscripted h.
Univariate analysis of the ratings of the alignment talk user alone yielded 
statistical significance for the niceness variable (F[4,252]=20.83, pc.OOO) and the 
dominance variable (F[4,2521=17.22, pc.OOO). The results for the status variable 
were statistically nonsignificant (F[4,252]=.838, p=.50).
Tukey's comparisons test was again used to ascertain which scenarios 
differed significantly. Scenario comparisons using only the ratings of the 
alignment talk user showed that, on the niceness variable, scenario 4 (mean=3.13) 
differred significantly from all other scenarios. Also, scenario 5 (mean=4.26) differed 
significantly from scenario 2 (mean=3.79). On the dominance variable, scenario 5 
(mean=3.69) varied from all other scenarios. Also, scenario 4 (mean=4.74) differed 
significantly from scenario 1 (mean=4.30). The means and standard deviations for
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the ratings of the alignment talk user alone, grouped by scenario, is displayed in 
table 3 -4 .
Table 3-4: Means and Standard Deviations for Speaker Using Alignment Talk
By Scenario
Conversational Scenario Niceness Dominance Status
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Scenario 1 4.16a .83 4.30eg .83 4.18 .67
Scenario 2 3.79ac .98 4.53e .83 4.06 .82
Scenario 3 4.00a .96 4.66e 1.03 3.60 .94
Scenario 4 3.13b .92 4.74eh .71 4.12 .95
Scenario 5 4.26ad .75 3.69f .90 3.94 1.02
Means subscripted a, differ significantly from means subscripted b.
Mean subscripted c, differs significantly from mean subscripted d.
Means subscripted e, differ significantly form mean subscripted f.
Mean subscripted g, differs significantly from mean subscripted h.
Chapter 4
DISCUSSION
4.1. Introduction
This research sought to identify the relationship between forms of alignment 
talk and inferences made within conversations. It was conducted under the 
guidance of one overriding research question: Does the use of alignment talk lead 
hearers to make inferences about the alignment talk user and, if so, what types of 
inferences are made?
The hypotheses set forth presume that alignment talk can function as a 
critical stimulus. That is, they presume subjects' perceptions of the relational roles 
being defined within the conversations can change as the alignment talk 
conventions change. The specific predictions made by the hypotheses reflect prior 
observational research on the function of alignment talk. Previous research 
concluded that the use of the metatalk conventions formulating and agendizing can 
serve to define and preserve a dominant and high status role. Although the 
literature is far from consensus on the effects of disclaimers, in general, hedges 
have been presumed to signal tentativeness and function as a low power, 
submissive device. Since credentialing is the conceptual opposite of hedging, it 
follows that credentialing should signal assertiveness. Finally, previous research on 
accounts has postulated that the degree of mitigation within the account is critical.
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Other literature has noted that the offering of accounts can function to define the 
speaker's role as submissive and low status.
The predictions made within the hypotheses were tested by presenting 70 
subjects with written transcripts of conversations containing alignment talk. Each 
subject received 5 different examples of one form of alignment talk. To control for 
the content of the conversations, the same basic conversational scenarios were 
used in testing each form of alignment talk.
A factor analysis of data collected revealed that subjects responded along 
three dimensions of evaluation: Niceness, dominance, and status. Analysis of 
variance tests showed statistical significance for the main effect of talk type when 
applied to subjects' ratings of the alignment talk user. Speakers using agendizing 
were rated significantly higher on dominance than speakers using hedges or a 
mitigating excuse.
Statistical analysis also revealed a main effect for conversational scenario on 
both the niceness and the dominance variable. These effects were statistically 
significant for the analysis of the ratings of only the alignment talk user and for 
the analysis of the differences in the ratings of both speakers within a scenario. 
There were no statistically significant interactions.
4.2. Factor Analysis
The factor analysis of the data revealed a three factor solution rather than 
the five factors expected. The hypotheses made predictions concerning four of the 
five predicted factors (the aesthetic quality factor was not included in the
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hypotheses but retained in the dependent measure in order to keep Mulac's RSDAS 
intact). The factors obtained do not allow for a separate and specific discussion of 
perceived dynamism since the dynamism scales were subsumed by the dominance 
factor. The results of this factor analysis indicate that subjects did not discriminate 
between dynamism and dominance.
The factor analysis revealed a niceness variable which will be discussed as 
identical to the friendliness variable mentioned within the hypotheses. The variable 
was renamed because it is a composite of scales from the Shellen and Bach (1983) 
instrument and from Mulac's (1976) RSDAS (see table 3 -1  for all scale loadings on 
all factors).
In retrospect it was unrealistic to expect the five factor solution. The results 
obtained are consistent with the results of the previous research from which the 
dependent measure was derived. Both Mulac (1976) and Shellen and Bach (1983) 
obtained factors comparable to the niceness factor (Shellen and Bach's friendliness 
dimension and Mulac's aesthetic quality) and the dominance factor (Shellen and 
Bach's dominance and Mulac's dynamism). In other words, previous research 
shows subjects tend to evaluate short transcripts along fairly basic dimensions. 
Essentially, it appears as though subjects simply make judgements about how  
powerful the speaker appears and whether or not they like the speaker.
Mulac's work also revealed a clear and robust status factor. It should be 
noted that Mulac's (1976) test transcripts consisted of monologues with speakers 
using various foreign dialects. The ethnic dialects may give subjects more of a 
basis for judgements of socio-economic status.
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4.3. Support of the Hypotheses
4.3.1. Agendizing
The first hypothesis predicted that speakers using the metatalk convention 
agendizing would be viewed as dominant and of high status. The analysis of the 
data collected provided partial support for the first hypothesis. On the dominance 
factor, speakers using agendizing were rated higher than any of the other 
alignment talk users. The ratings of the speakers using agendizing were 
statistically significant when compared with ratings of speakers using hedging or a 
mitigating excuse (see table 3-2). This result helps validate the findings of Ragan 
(1983) and Ragan and Hopper (1981). Their observational studies noted that within 
the context of a job interview, the ostensibly dominant, higher status interviewer 
was much more likely to use agendizing than the applicant. The results of the 
present research indicate that hearers perceive agendizing as a dominant move 
and that such perceptions may occur in contexts other than a job interview. 
Agendizing may often serve to help define and preserve one's role as the dominant 
speaker, even in a casual conversation.
The first hypothesis should be viewed as only partially supported for two  
reasons. First, the prediction that the speaker using agendizing would be seen as 
of higher status received no empirical support. All analyses found no statistical 
significance on the status factor. Second, the ratings of the agendizing speaker 
were statistically significant only when compared to two other types of alignment 
talk, not when compared to the control version. The question of which 
comparisons are most appropriate will be discussed later in this chapter.
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4.3.2. Formulations
Formulations were tested as a representative form of evaluative metatalk. 
The second hypothesis predicted that speakers using formulations would be 
perceived as significantly more dominant and of higher status than other speakers. 
This hypothesis received no empirical support, resulting in the failure to reject the 
null hypothesis. Although the means for the ratings of the speakers using 
formulations were numerically higher than all other forms of talk on the status 
variable and higher than all others except agendizing on the dominance variable, 
the differences were not statistically significant. Therefore, these differences may 
have occurred by chance.
Ragan (1983) and Ragan and Hopper (1981) observed that job interviewers 
were much more likely to use formulations than the interviewees. The results of 
the present research indicate that formulations may not be recognized as 
dominant, high status moves by hearers at all or, that formulations may only play a 
special role within special contexts such as the job interview.
There is at least one other reasonable explanation for the fact that the use of 
formulations did not have a significant effect on perceptions of dominance or 
status. Heritage and Watson (1979) note that formulations normally conform to 
adjacency pair structure. They are either accepted or rejected by the hearer. In 3 of 
the 5 formulation test scenarios, the formulation is the last line of the transcript 
(see Appendix A; formulation scenes 3,4 and 5) and there is no reply to the 
formulation. The subject had no way of knowing how the formulation was treated  
by the other speaker. In one scenario the formulation is accepted (Appendix A;
59
formulation scene 2) and in the final scenario (Appendix A; formulation scene 1) 
the formulation is ignored and a remark is made about someone else coming into 
the room. Neither Ragan (1983) nor Ragan and Hopper (1981) comment about how 
job applicants responded to formulations. It is possible that in order for a 
formulation to define and preserve a dominant, high status role, it must be 
accepted by the other conversant.
4.3.3. Accounts
The third hypothesis made two predictions. First, a significant difference was 
expected between speakers using a highly mitigating account and those using an 
aggravating account on both the niceness and the dominance variable. The 
analysis of variance did not support this prediction. In fact, the group means for 
the two types of accounts were nearly identical on both variables (see table 3-2). 
Evidently, in a short exchange, the effect of a single account is not altered by the 
degree of mitigation within the account. The data also failed to support the 
second prediction that all account users would be seen as of lower status than 
speakers not offering accounts.
The statistically significant results discussed earlier in support of the first 
hypothesis offer some support to the third hypothesis. One form of account, a 
mitigating excuse, was rated significantly lower on the dominance factor than 
some other talk (see table 3 -2 ). Numerically, the speakers using the mitigating 
excuse were rated lower on the dominance factor than any other talk type. 
However, the differences were statistically significant only in comparison to a 
speaker using agendizing. This result does offer some support to the hypothesis, 
however minimal.
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The interview research by Ragan (1983) and Ragan and Hopper (1981) 
identified the offering of accounts as characteristic of a submissive, low status 
role. The present study indicates that the use of a single account in a short 
exchange does not necessarily lead hearers to infer a submissive, low status role 
for the account user. The results of this study may not apply to situations where a 
number of accounts are offered by only one speaker, as in the job interview. The 
case may be that it is the ratio of accounts offerred by each speaker that helps 
hearers infer roles. For instance, if several mitigating excuses are offerred by one 
party in the same conversation, it is likely that a submissive, lower status role 
would be implied.
4.3.4. Disclaimers
The final hypothesis predicted that speakers using a disclaimer in the form of 
a hedge would be perceived as less dominant than speakers using credentialing. 
The analysis of the data showed no statistically significant differences between the 
two talk types. However, it should be noted that numerically, speakers using 
credentialing were rated higher than speakers using hedging.
This hypothesis also predicted that all users of disclaimers would be seen as 
more friendly than speakers not using disclaimers. The analysis of the data 
offerred some minimal support for this second prediction. The comparison between 
speakers using a hedge and speakers using agendizing was statistically significant 
on the dominance variable. Numerically, the ratings for speakers using disclaimers 
were the two highest means on the niceness variable (see table 3 -2 ). However, the 
differences between the means for the disclaimers and the other talk types were 
not statistically significant on the niceness variable.
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The fact that the speakers using hedges were perceived as significantly less 
dominant than other speakers indicates that hedging can seen as a submissive 
conversational move. Bell et al. (1984) concluded their study by saying that 
previous research may have ascribed undue importance to the role of disclaimers 
in conversations. The present study indicates their conclusion may have been 
premature. The use of a single disclaimer in the form of a hedge did affect
subjects' perceptions when compared to more dominant forms of alignment talk.
4.3.5. The Overriding Research Question
The hypotheses discussed above were set forth as specific probes under a 
broader question aimed at exploring the effects of alignment talk. The process of 
testing those hypotheses and the results, considered together, provide some 
answers to the research question. Specific analyses and apriori comparisons are 
discussed above. More general trends in the data provide some insight. As has 
already been indicated in several places, ranking the means in numerical order by 
talk type reveals some interesting trends. These rankings are displayed in table 
4-1 .
First, the reader is reminded that, by definition, alignment talk conventions 
are devices utilized by one speaker to make his meaning or understanding clearer 
by supplying some context. The rankings of the talk types suggest that how one 
goes about supplying that context may impact on inferences.
An examination of the rankings for the niceness factor shows a rank order
congruent with the theme of the hypotheses. The two talk types ranked highest 
are the disclaimers. Both types of disclaimer preface and qualify a statement.
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Table 4-1: Rank Ordering of Cell Means For Talk Type
Order on Niceness Order on Dominance Order on Status
Talk Type Mean Talk Type Mean Talk Type Mean
Hedging 4.19 Agendizing 4.78 Formulating 4.36
Credentialing 4.18 Formulating 4.61 Hedging 4.13
Control 4.10 Credentialing 4.42 Credentialing 4.11
Formulating 3.73 Aggravating
Justification
4.41 Control 4.09
Agendizing 3.71 Control 4.21 Aggravating 4.08
Justification
Mitigating 3.70 Hedging 4.12 Mitigating 3.90
Excuse Excuse
Aggravating 3.56 Mitigating 4.12 Agendizing 3.79
Justification Excuse
Qualifying one's remarks in advance may signal to others a concern for clarity or 
may be perceived as an assurance that the speaker is operating within the 
guidance of the cooperation norm.
At the bottom of the rankings for niceness is the effect for an aggravating 
justification. The justifications used were denials of injury. The rankings imply that 
defending one's actions by denying that any damage has occurred may be an 
indication that one is not invested in getting along with the other speaker.
One counterintuitive ranking on the niceness variable is also present. The 
ranking for a mitigating excuse is numerically low. The form of mitigating excuse 
tested was an appeal to one's own effort and care (see Appendix A or table 2-2). 
The mitigating excuses were written to show a high degree of awareness and 
concern for the social rule under consideration. The rankings indicate that 
subjects may have interpreted the excuses to be elaborate rationalizations for
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untoward behavior. Ragan (1983) noted that job applicants often gave a negative 
impression within an interview by providing accounts even when an account 
seemed unnecessary. The present results also support the notion that often saying 
nothing may be better than even a highly mitigating account.
An inspection of the rankings on the dominance variable also reveal an order 
congruent with the predictions of the hypotheses. The two metatalk conventions 
previously observed to define and support a dominant role, agendizing and 
formulating, are at the top of the ordering. The most tentative disclaimer, the  
hedge, and the mitigating excuse are at the bottom. Both the hedge and the  
mitigating excuse were predicted to signal a submissive role. Furthermore, the  
ratings on the dominance variable group together as expected relative to the 
control version. That is, the talk types predicted to signal dominance rank higher 
than the control version and the conventions predicted to signal submissiveness 
rank below the control. The hedging and the mitigating excuse were expected to 
be "one-down" moves showing submission. The other talk types including the 
more assertive disclaimer, the credentialing, and the aggravating justification were  
expected to be the more dominant moves.
The rankings on the status variable do not support the theme of the 
hypotheses. Although formulating is ranked first, the other ostensibly high status 
metataik convention, agendizing, is at the bottom. Also the disclaimers are ranked 
high in the order, the opposite of what was expected.
Taken together, the statistical analyses and the inspection of the numerical 
rankings support some general conclusions germane to the research question. The
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present research does not support the notion that the use of alignment talk can 
serve as a cue for inferences about social or economic status. The reliability of the 
status factor was relatively low (Cronbach's Coefficient Alpha=.61). Also, the 
univariate analysis of variance subsequent to the MANOVA yielded a significance 
level of .36 on the status variable, indicating a substantial probability that any 
group differences on the status factor were attributable to chance. Considering the 
statistical analyses and the rank ordering of the means, it is unlikely that any 
single usage of an alignment talk convention can impact on perceptions of status.
This research does offer support to the notion that alignment talk use can be 
a cue for inferences about niceness and dominance. First, the statistical analyses 
did reveal a significant group effect for talk type on the dominance variable. Also, 
univariate analysis showed that the effect on the niceness variable approached 
statistical significance, producing a significance level of .08. Considering the rank 
order of the group means, it appears likely that conversants can use alignment talk 
as a cue for inferences along a niceness dimension. Both group effects obtained 
even though only one stimulus line was present within the test scenarios. That is, 
it was not necessary to "hammer" subjects with unrealistic doses of alignment talk 
as suggested by Bell et al. (1984).
Further tentative conclusions can be drawn about specific talk types. It 
appears as though the use of a disclaimer can help one to be perceived as a nice, 
kind individual. Also, the form of the disclaimer may impact on whether you are 
perceived as nice and dominant or nice and submissive. Similar conclusions can 
be drawn about the use of accounts. The present results indicate that the offering
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of an account can lead to impressions that one is not kind or nice. Furthermore, if 
the account is particularly mitigating, one will also be perceived as the submissive 
speaker.
This initial exploration of the effects of metatalk indicates that using explicit 
metatalk conventions can lead to perceptions of dominance. The significant main 
effect for agendizing occurred with only one example of agendizing placed into the 
scenarios. The effect for formulating was not statistically significant, but its high 
rank position on the dominance variable implies some effect may be present.
4.4. Implications
The present study carries several implications for the future study of 
alignment talk and other linguistic variables. Jackson and Jacobs (1983) argue 
convincingly that testing a language variable within only one scenario produces 
results applicable only to the context of that scenario. This research used multiple 
scenarios in testing talk types in order to validate the generalizability of the 
results. The analysis of the data from this study produced robust statistical 
significance on the main effect for scenario (see tables 3 -3  and 3-4 ). This 
confirms the rather obvious conclusion that the subject matter and general content 
of the conversations impact on subjects' impressions. It is obvious that any 
language research must in some manner deal with how subject matter and general 
context of conversations affect subjects.
One option available to language researchers is to stabilize the effect of test 
scenario context. This can be accomplished through the pretesting of transcripts.
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That is, the researcher could have subjects rate speakers within "generic" 
transcripts, transcripts not containing the language variable of interest. The 
researcher could evaluate the ratings, make changes and by repeatedly recycling 
the transcripts, it seems likely that one could eventually obtain a number of 
scenarios in which the ratings of the speakers were essentially equal on the 
dimensions of interest. The language variables of interest could then be inserted 
and the effect measured.
Another option is to conduct studies of language effects within narrow, 
specified contexts. Subjects could simply be told exactly who the speakers are, 
where they are and be told relevant relational information. This procedure would 
allow, for example, for interviewees offering mitigating excuses to be compared 
with other candidates using aggravating justifications. Once language effects have 
been isolated within specific contexts, the same language variables could be tested 
within other contexts to see if the effects can be generalized.
Regardless of how researchers manage contextual effects, much of the 
validity of language effects studies hinges on the researchers making intelligent 
and informed comparisons of talk types. The task of interpreting the statistical 
results of this research raised an interesting issue. The results produced a 
significant comparison between the use of agendizing and the use of hedging or a 
mitigating excuse. No groups differed significantly from the control version. 
Traditionally, language effects have been thought to be isolated and meaningful 
comparisons made by comparing ratings of talk containing the variables of interest 
with identical talk with the variable extracted. Although this procedure makes 
intuitive sense, further thought on the procedure brings its wisdom into doubt.
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Ostensibly, our linguistic choices approach infinity. Realistically though, it is 
probable that our reasonable choices in any given situation are limited. The point 
here is that the most realistic conceptualization of a conversation does not have 
one speaker deciding, for example, whether a disclaimer should be included or not. 
The choices are more likely to be made between types of linguistic conventions or 
between general styles of talk. The student who comes into an instructor's office 
is not choosing between hedging before making an accusation and just making the 
accusation. She may be more likely to be choosing between more general 
strategies. For instance, she may be choosing between the hedged accusation of 
unfairness and offering a justification for her past performance.
The theoretically interesting question deals with comparisons between 
realistic language alternatives. Comparisons between a sentence containing a 
given talk type and a control version may not be meaningful. Preliminary, 
descriptive research should focus on exactly what linguistic strategies people 
choose between in order for meaningful comparisons to later be made.
The original impetus of this research was to investigate how the use of 
alignment talk may contribute to context. In retrospect, at least tw o other 
approaches may have been more effective. First, a smaller, more focused study 
may have provided clearer results. For instance, testing only for the effects of 
metatalk conventions within a variety of specified contexts may have provided a 
clearer picture of their contributions to context.
Finally, a more open ended, descriptive approach to investigating the creation 
of context may be appropriate. One approach would be to provide subjects with
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only the stimulus line and ask them to provide the surrounding conversation. 
Having that task completed by native language users may produce some common 
contextual themes around examples of talk within the same category. For example, 
one might predict that subjects would consistently construct conversation around 
an example of agendizing which projected the speaker doing the agendizing into a 
dominant role.
In summary, this research has provided some insight into the effects of 
alignment talk on conversational inferences. The descriptive research that is drawn 
upon by this study is quite valuable in that it provides rigorous documentation of 
how people use language strategically. Pure description is not enough, especially 
when that description includes statements about what is being accomplished by 
the language choices. It is essential that we not rely on intuitive assessments of 
how language affects people. We need to test those intuitive assessments in 
order to really understand what occurs within conversations.
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Appendix A 
Test Scenarios as Presented to Subjects
Scene 1, HEDGING
*marks stimulus line
A: What can I do for you ?
B: I was wondering about absences.
A: You want to know how many you have or what ?
B: Well, yeah-l've got four, but I think two of those should be excused.
A: Yeah, you've got four. Did you have a documented excuse for those two
B: No, I didn't.
A: Well, I'm sorry, but you know it says in the syllabus you must have a 
documented excuse for an absence.
*B: This is just my opinion, but the syllabus isn't clear about absences.
A: I'm not responsible for the policy, I just have to enforce it.
B: I think it's not fair.
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Scene 2, HEDGING
*marks stimulus line
A: Hey, I turned that paper in on tim e yesterday. Overall it went pretty 
good.
B: I'm almost done.
A: I saw Chris last night just getting started on the whole project.
B: Chris sure has had some problems around here lately.
A: Yeah, it seems that way.
*B: I haven't known Chris for very long at all, but I think 
it's just lack of intelligence. Chris just hasn't got it.
A: Well, there's certainly something wrong...hey, I gotta go.
B: Me too. I need to get home before it's too late.
72
Scene 3, HEDGING
*marks stimulus line
A: This is room 339, right ?
B: Yeah, hello. I didn't expect anyone here for a while.
A: I guess we're a little bit early.
B: Yeah, I've seen you around here before, but we've never really met.
A: I'm Casey Miller, I'm in Psychology.
B: Nice to meet you. I'm Chris Beckle. I was just lookin' at the text.
*A: I've never had this prof before, but I think this class is going to be 
boring.
B: The reading seems OK. I've done a little, I thought I should get started. 
A: Oh, I haven't bought the book yet.
B: I think that's the instructor there.
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Scene 4, HEDGING
*marks stimulus line
A: Well it's good to have that over with.
B: Yeah, I'm glad I went to those study sessions.
A: I didn't go.
B: I'd like to know what my grade is.
A: Yeah, I hope we get 'em back this week.
B: Me too.
*A: I've never had a class in this department before, but I don't
think they care if we get 'em back or not.
B: It'd be nice to have 'em back by Friday.
A: Oh, that book I borrowed is in your mailbox in the office.
B: Oh yeah, I almost forgot about that.
A: And I wanted to tell you Andy will be over later on.
B: I should be home. I don't have anything planned as of right now.
Scene 5, HEDGING
*marks stimulus line
A: I've been lookin' all this over here.
B: You figuring out your grade point average ?
A: Yeah, it's important for what I want to do. I've been taking a lot of 
different classes, doing OK.
B: I remember you had that advanced math class.
A: Yeah, it was good, just too early in the morning. Your grades OK ?
B: I don't even know.
A: I always keep track. I need good grades to get a decent job.
*B: I haven't researched the job market yet, but I think it depends on the 
really.
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Scene 1, CREDENTIALING
*marks stimulus line
A: What can I do for you ?
B: I was wondering about absences.
A: You want to know how many you have or what ?
B: Well, yeah-l've got four, but I think two of those should be excused.
A: Yeah, you've got four. Did you have a documented excuse for those two ?
B: No, I didn't.
A: Well, I'm sorry, but you know it says in the syllabus you must have a 
documented excuse for an absence.
*B: I've read the syllabus very carefully, and the syllabus isn't clear about 
absences.
A: I'm not responsible for the policy, I just have to enforce it.
B: I think it's not fair.
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Scene 2, CREDENTIALING
*marks stimulus line
A: Hey, I turned that paper in on time yesterday. Overall it went pretty 
good.
B: I'm almost done.
A: I saw Chris last night just getting started on the whole project.
B: Chris sure has had some problems around here lately.
A: Yeah, it seems that way.
*B: Well, I've known Chris pretty well for a long time, it's just lack of 
intelligence. Chris just hasn't got it.
A: Well, there's certainly something wrong...hey, I gotta go.
B: Me too. I need to get home before it's too late.
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Scene 3, CREDENTIALING
*marks stimulus line
A: This is room 339, right ?
B: Yeah, hello. I didn't expect anyone here for a while.
A: I guess we're a little bit early.
B: Yeah, I've seen you around here before, but we've never really met.
A: I'm Casey Miller, I'm in Psychology.
B: Nice to meet you. I'm Chris Beckle. I was just lookin' at the text.
*A: I've had classes from this prof before, this class is going to be boring. 
B: The reading seems OK. I've done a little, I thought I should get started. 
A: Oh, I haven't bought the book yet.
B: I think that's the instructor there.
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Scene 4, CREDENTIALING
*marks stimulus line
A: Well it's good to have that over with.
B: Yeah, I'm glad I went to those study sessions
A: I didn't go.
B: I'd like to know what my grade is.
A: Yeah, I hope we get 'em back this week.
B: Me too.
*A: My roommate has had a lot of classes in this department, they don't care 
if we get 'em back or not.
B: It'd be nice to have 'em back by Friday.
A: Oh, that book I borrowed is in your mailbox in the office.
B: Oh yeah, I almost forgot about that.
A: And I wanted to tell you Andy will be over later on.
B: I should be home. I don't have anything planned as of right now.
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Scene 5, CREDENTIALING
*marks stimulus line
A: I've been lookin' all this over here.
B: You figuring out your grade point average ?
A: Yeah, it's important for what I want to do. I've been taking a lot of 
different classes, doing OK.
B: I remember you had that advanced math class.
A: Yeah, it was good, just too early in the morning. Your grades OK ?
B: I don't even know.
A: I always keep track. I need good grades to get a decent job.
*B: Well, my brother works in personnel for a big corporation, I think it 
depends on the job, really.
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Scene 1, AGGRAVATING JUSTIFICATION
*marks stimulus line
A: What can I do for you ?
B: I was wondering about absences.
A: You want to know how many you have or what ?
B: Well, yeah-l've got four, but I think two of those should be excused.
A: Yeah, you've got four. Did you have a documented excuse for those two ?
*B: No, I didn't. I missed those two days you went over the test. I aced that 
exam, so I didn't need to be there.
A: Well, I'm sorry, but you know it says in the syllabus you must have a 
a documented excuse for an absence.
B: The syllabus isn't clear about absences.
A: I'm not responsible for the policy, I just have to enforce it.
B: I think it's not fair.
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Scene 2, AGGRAVATING JUSTIFICATION 
*marks stimulus line
A: Hey, I turned that paper in on tim e yesterday. Overall it went pretty 
good.
*B: I'm almost done. This paper is only 10% of our grade and that instructor 
will always take them late, so it doesn't matter.
A: I saw Chris last night just getting started on the whole project.
B: Chris sure has had some problems around here lately.
A: Yeah, it seems that way.
B: It's just lack of intelligence. Chris just hasn't got it.
A: Well, there's certainly something wrong...hey, I gotta go.
B: Me too. I need to get home before it's too late.
Scene 3, AGGRAVATING JUSTIFICATION
*marks stimulus line
A: This is room 339, right ?
B: Yeah, hello. I didn't expect anyone here for a while.
A: I guess we're a little bit early.
B: Yeah, I've seen you around here before, but we've never really met.
A: I'm Casey Miller, I'm in Psychology.
B: Nice to meet you. I'm Chris Beckle. I was just lookin' at the text 
A: Well, this class is going to be boring.
B: The reading seems OK. I've done a little, I thought I should get started.
*A: Oh. I haven't bought the book yet. Sometimes the profs only test you over 
the lecture material. A lot of books are really a waste of money. I can 
always get it later.
B: I think that's the instructor there.
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Scene 4, AGGRAVATING JUSTIFICATION
*marks stimulus line
A: Well it's good to have that over with.
B: Yeah, I'm glad I went to those study sessions.
*A: I didn't go. Studying in a group is a waste of time. They just go over 
what we did in class. Those sessions just confuse rtie.
B: I'd like to know what my grade is.
A: Yeah, I hope we get 'em back next week.
B: Me too.
A: The don't think they care if we get 'em back or not.
B: It'd be nice to have 'em back by Friday.
A: Oh, that book I borrowed is in your mailbox in the office.
B: Oh yeah, I almost forgot about that.
A: And I wanted to tell you Andy will be over later on.
B: I should be home. I don't have anything planned as of right now.
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Scene 5, AGGRAVATING JUSTIFICATION
*marks stimulus line
A: I've been lookin' ail this over here.
B: You figuring out your grade point average ?
A: Yeah, it's important for what I want to do. I've been taking a lot of 
different classes, doing OK.
B: I remember you had that advanced math class.
A: Yeah, it was good, just too early in the morning. Your grades OK ?
*B: I don't even know. I don't worry about it, you're supposed to have fun in 
college. Employers look more at your special skills than GPA.
A: I always keep track. I need good grades to get a decent job.
B: It depends on the job, really.
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Scene 1, MITIGATING EXCUSE
*marks stimulus line
A: What can I do for you ?
B: I was wondering about absences.
A: You want to know how many you have or what ?
B: Well, yeah-l've got four, but I think two of those should be excused.
A: Yeah, you've got four. Did you have a documented excuse for those two ?
/
*B: No, I didn't. I made sure to check in to the Health Center when I got 
sick, so there'd be a record. I called your office, but I couldn't get a 
note.
A: Well, I'm sorry, but you know it says in the syllabus you must have a 
documented excuse for an absence.
B: The syllabus isn't clear about absences.
A: I'm not responsible for the policy, I just have to enforce it.
B: I think it's not fair.
86
Scene 2, MITIGATING EXCUSE
*marks stimulus line
A: Hey, I turned that paper in on time yesterday. Overall it went pretty 
good.
*B: I'm almost done. I've been working real hard on it. I've been
budgeting my time and talking to the instructor about it every day.
A: I saw Chris last night just getting started on the whole project.
B: Chris sure has had some problems around here lately.
A: Yeah, it seems that way.
B: It's just lack of intelligence. Chris just hasn't got it.
A: Well, there's certainly something wrong...hey, I gotta go.
B: Me too. I need to get home before it's too late.
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Scene 3, MITIGATING EXCUSE
*marks stimulus line
A: This is room 339, right ?
B: Yeah, hello. I didn't expect anyone here for a while.
A: I guess we're a little bit early.
B: Yeah, I've seen you around here before, but we've never really met.
A: I'm Casey Miller, I'm in Psychology.
B: Nice to meet you. I'm Chris Beckle. I was just lookin' at the text.
A: Well, this class is going to be boring.
B: The reading seems OK. I've done a little, I thought I should get started.
*A: Oh. I haven't bought the book yet. I talked to the bookstore and they have 
one on hold for me. I made sure to get the money out of the bank today.
B: I think that's the instructor there.
88
Scene 4, MITIGATING EXCUSE
*marks stimulus line
A: Well it's good to have that over with.
B: Yeah, I'm glad I went to those study sessions
*A: I didn't go. I marked the dates and times on my calender and I had the 
study sheets, but I never made it.
B: I'd like to know what my grade is.
A: Yeah, I hope we get 'em back this week.
B: Me too.
A: They don't care if we get 'em back or not.
B: It'd be nice to have 'em back by Friday.
A: Oh, that book I borrowed is in your mailbox in the office.
B: Oh yeah, I almost forgot about that.
A: And I wanted to tell you Andy will be over later on.
B: I should be home. I don't have anything planned as of right now.
89
Scene 5, MITIGATING EXCUSE
*marks stimulus line
A: I've been lookin' all this over here.
B: You figuring out your grade point average ?
A: Yeah, it's important for what I want to do. I've been taking a lot of 
different classes, doing OK.
B: I remember you had that advanced math class.
A: Yeah, it was good, just too early in the morning. Your grades OK ?
*B: I don't even know. I work hard in my classes. I try to get good grades 
all the time but I don't know what my GPA is.
A: I always keep track. I need good grades to get a decent job.
B: It depends on the job, really.
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Scene 1, AGENDIZING
*marks stimulus line
A: What can I do for you ?
*B: I'd like for us to discuss absences.
A: You want to know how many you have or what ?
B: Well, yeah-l've got four, but I think two of those should be excused.
A: Yeah, you've got four. Did you have a documented excuse for those two ?
B: No, I didn't.
A: Well, I'm sorry, but you know it says in the syllabus you must have a 
documented excuse for an absence.
B: The syllabus isn't clear about absences.
A: I'm not responsible for the policy, I just have to enforce it.
B: I think it's not fair.
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Scene 2, AGENDIZING
*marks stimulus line
A: Hey, I turned that paper in on time yesterday. Overall it went pretty 
good.
B: I'm almost done.
A: I saw Chris last night just getting started on the whole project.
B: Chris sure has had some problems around here lately.
A: Yeah, it seems that way.
*B: Let me tell you the reason for Chris's troubles.
A: OK.
B: It's just lack of intelligence. Chris just hasn't got it.
A: Well, there's certainly something wrong...hey, I gotta go.
B: Me too. I need to get home before it's too late.
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Scene 3, AGENDIZING
*marks stimulus line
A: This is room 339, right ?
B: Yeah, hello. I didn't expect anyone here for a while.
A: I guess we're a little bit early.
B: Yeah, I've seen you around here before, but we've never really met.
*A: Let me formally introduce myself.
B: OK.
A: I'm Casey Miller, I'm in Psychology.
B: Nice to meet you. I'm Chris Beckle. I was just lookin' at the text.
A: Well, this class is going to be boring.
B: The reading seems OK. I've done a little, I thought I should get started. 
A: Oh, I haven't bought the book yet.
B: I think that's the instructor there.
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Scene 4, AGENDIZING
*marks stimulus line
A: Well it's good to have that over with.
B: Yeah, I'm glad I went to those study sessions 
A: I didn't go.
B: I'd like to know what my grade is.
A: Yeah, I hope we get 'em back this week.
B: Me too.
A: They don't care if we get 'em back or not.
B: It'd be nice to have 'em back by Friday.
*A: Oh, I need to tell you two things.
B: What ?
A: That book I borrowed is in your mailbox in the office.
B: Oh yeah, I almost forgot about that.
A: And I wanted to tell you Andy will be over later on.
B: I should be home. I don't have anything planned as of right now.
Scene 5, AGENDIZING
*marks stimulus line
A: I've been lookin' all this over here.
*B: Let's talk about grades. You figuring out your grade point average
A: Yeah, it's important for what I want to do. I've been taking a lot of 
different classes, doing OK.
B: I remember you had that advanced math class.
A: Yeah, it was good, just too early in the morning. Your grades OK ? 
B: I don't even know.
A: I always keep track. I need good grades to get a decent job.
B: It depends on the job, really.
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Scene 1, FORMULATING
*marks stimulus line
A: What can I do for you ?
B: I was wondering about absences.
A: You want to know how many you have or what ?
B: Well, yeah-l've got four, but I think two of those should be excused.
A: Yeah, you've got four. Did you have a documented excuse for those two ?
B: No, I didn't.
A: Well, I'm sorry, but you know it says in the syllabus you must have a 
documented excuse for an absence.
B: The syllabus isn't clear about absences.
A: I'm not responsible for the policy, I just have to enforce it.
*B: So you won't make any exceptions about absences. I think it's not fair.
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Scene 2, FORMULATING
*marks stimulus line
A: Hey, I turned that paper in on time yesterday. Overall it went pretty 
good.
B: I'm almost done.
A: I saw Chris last night just getting started on the whole project.
B: Chris sure has had some problems around here lately.
A: Yeah, it seems that way.
B: It's just lack of intelligence. Chris just hasn't got it.
A: Well, there's certainly something wrong.
*B: Then you agree with me about Chris.
97
Scene 3, FORMULATING
*marks stimulus line
A: This is room 339, right ?
B: Yeah, hello. I didn't expect anyone here for a while.
A: I guess we're a little bit early.
B: Yeah, I've seen you around here before, but we've never really met.
A: I'm Casey Miller, I'm in Psychology.
B: Nice to meet you. I'm Chris Beckle. I was just lookin' at the text.
A: Well, this class is going to be boring.
B: The reading seems OK. I've done a little, I thought I should get started. 
*A: Oh. You're all ready to begin the quarter.
B: I think that's the instructor there.
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Scene 4, FORMULATING
*marks stimulus line
A: Well it's good to have that over with.
B: Yeah, I'm glad I went to those study sessions 
A: I didn't go.
B: I'd like to know what my grade is.
*A: You think you did well, then.
B: I hope so.
A: Well, I hope we get 'em back this week.
B: Me too.
A: They don't care if we get 'em back or not.
B: It'd be nice to have 'em back by Friday.
A: Oh, that book I borrowed is in your mailbox in the office.
B: Oh yeah, I almost forgot about that.
A: And I wanted to tell you Andy will be over later on.
B: I should be home. I don't have anything planned as of right now.
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Scene 5, FORMULATING
*marks stimulus line
A: I've been lookin' all this over here.
B: You figuring out your grade point average ?
A: Yeah, it's important for what I want to do. I've been taking a lot of 
different classes, doing OK.
B: I remember you had that advanced math class.
A: Yeah, it was good, just too early in the morning. Your grades OK ?
B: I don't even know.
A: I always keep track. I need good grades to get a decent job.
*B: Oh, so your grades are your top priority.
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Scene 1, CONTROL
*marks stimulus line
A: What can I do for you ?
B: I was wondering about absences.
A: You want to know how many you have or what ?
B: Well, yeah-l've got four, but I think two of those should be excused.
A: Yeah, you've got four. Did yo u jiave  a documented excuse for those two ?
B: No, I didn't.
A: Well, I'm sorry, but you know it says in the syllabus you must have a 
documented excuse for an absence.
B: The syllabus isn't clear about absences.
A: I'm not responsible for the policy, I just have to enforce it.
B: I think it's not fair.
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Scene 2, CONTROL
*marks stimulus line
A: Hey, I turned that paper in on time yesterday. Overall it went pretty 
good.
B: I'm almost done.
A: I saw Chris last night just getting started on the whole project.
B: Chris sure has had some problems around here lately.
A: Yeah, it seems that way.
B: It's just lack of intelligence. Chris just hasn't got it.
A: Well, there's certainly something wrong...hey, I gotta go.
B: Me too. I need to get home before it's too late.
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Scene 3, CONTROL
*marks stimulus line
A: This is room 339, right ?
B: Yeah, hello. I didn't expect anyone here for a while.
A: I guess we're a little bit early.
B: Yeah, I've seen you around here before, but we've never really met.
A: I'm Casey Miller, I'm in Psychology.
B: Nice to meet you. I'm Chris Beckle. I was just lookin' at the text.
A: Well, this class is going to be boring.
B: The reading seems OK. I've done a little, I thought I should get started. 
A: Oh, I haven't bought the book yet.
B: I think that's the instructor there.
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Scene 4, CONTROL
*marks stimulus line
A: Well it's good to have that over with.
B: Yeah, I'm glad I went to those study sessions
A: I didn't go.
B: I'd like to know what my grade is.
A: Yeah, I hope we get 'em back this week.
B: Me too.
A: They don't care if we get 'em back or not.
B: It'd be nice to have 'em back by Friday.
A: Oh, that book I borrowed is in your mailbox in the office.
B: Oh yeah, I almost forgot about that.
A: And I wanted to tell you Andy will be over later on.
B: I should be home. I don't have anything planned as of right now.
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Scene 5, CONTROL
*marks stimulus line
A: I've been lookin' all this over here.
B: You figuring out your grade point average ?
A: Yeah, it's important for what I want to do. I've been taking a lot of 
different classes, doing OK.
B: I remember you had that advanced math class.
A: Yeah, it was good, just too early in the morning. Your grades OK ?
B: I don't even know.
A: I always keep track. I need good grades to get a decent job.
B: It depends on the job, really.
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Appendix B 
Booklet Instructions as Presented to Subjects
We would like your help with a communication study we are doing. The 
study is about the impressions people form in conversatons. If you agree 
to help, please do the following.
1) Read each segment of conversation provided at the top of 
the following pages.
2) Fill out the scales below each segment by placing an A 
and a B in the space which most accurately indicates your 
impression of each of the speakers.
For example: after reading a segment of talk, the impressions of each 
speaker might be represented on one scale like this:
sensitive  :0_:_:_: \jfh.  insensitive
this would indicate the impression that B was sensitive and an 
impression that A was more insensitive
OR
rich :_:__:_: _ poor
indicating both A and B to be poor but B somewhat more than A.
OR
shy  :/[$:_:_:_: : assertive
indicating both A and B seemed equally shy.
You may place an A or a B at any point on the scale but please place 
BOTH on every scale.
SOME OF THE IMPRESSIONS MAY BE DIFFICULT BUT PLEASE GIVE YOUR 
IMPRESSIONS BASED ON THE TALK PRESENTED
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Appendix C
Rating Scales as Presented to Subjects
sensitive 
weak 
active 
wishy-washy 
abusive 
gentle 
sour 
beautiful 
cruel 
literate 
blue collar 
soft 
aggressive 
friendly 
assertive 
awful
high social class 
poor 
dominant 
displeasing 
decisive 
unfeeling
insensitive
strong
passive
strong-willed
complimentary
harsh
sweet
ugly
compassionate 
illiterate 
white collar 
loud
unaggressive
hostile
shy
nice
low social class 
rich
submissive
pleasing
indecisive
empathic
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Appendix D
Means and Standard Deviations by Talk Type
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Table D - l :  Difference Between Alignment Talk User and Speaker Not Using
Alignment Talk on Niceness Factor
Form of Talk Mean Standard Oeviation Number
Hedging-for all scenarios -.05 1.64 50
scenario 1 -.55 1.50 10
scenario 2 -.55 .79 10
scenario 3 1.38 2.47 10
scenario 4 -.48 1.22 10
scenario 5 -.07 1.07 10
Credentialing-for all scenarios -.02 1.43 50
scenario 1 -.51 .91 10
scenario 2 -.74 1.12 10
scenario 3 1.68 1.38 10
scenario 4 -.71 1.12 10
scenario 5 .17 1.14 10
Aggravating Justification-all scenarios -.76 1.82 50
scenario 1 -1.19 1.21 10
scenario 2 -1.62 2.05 10
scenario 3 1.06 2.03 10
scenario 4 -1.14 1.30 10
scenario 5 -.93 1.25 10
Mitigating Excuse-for all scenarios -.81 1.59 50
scenario 1 -.81 .92 10
scenario 2 -1.44 1.88 10
scenario 3 -.16 2.13 10
scenario 4 -1.58 1.10 10
scenario 5 -.07 1.23 10
Agendizing-for all scenarios -.80 1.69 50
scenario 1 -.92 1.29 10
scenario 2 -1.03 1.45 10
scenario 3 .24 1.38 10
scenario 4 -1.56 2.28 10
scenario 5 -.71 1.65 10
Form ulating-for all scenarios -.78 1.82 50
scenario 1 -.84 .92 10
scenario 2 -1.16 1.32 10
scenario 3 .53 2.78 10
scenario 4 -2 .06 1.44 10
Scenario 5 -.35 1.19 10
Contro l-for all scenarios -.22 1.38 50
scenario 1 -.44 .89 10
scenario 2 -.56 .70 10
scenario 3 1.21 1.69 10
scenario 4 -1 .19 1.33 10
scenario 5 -.10 .99 10
109
Table D-2: Difference Between Alignment Talk User and Speaker Not Using
Alignment Talk on Dominance Factor
Form of Talk Mean Standard Deviation Number
Hedging-for all scenarios -.72 1.51 50
scenario 1 -.69 1.17 10
scenario 2 .06 1.49 10
scenario 3 -1 .10 1.74 10
scenario 4 -.23 .82 10
scenario 5 -1.64 1.76 10
Credentialing-for all scenarios -.23 1.43 50
scenario 1 .16 1.60 10
scenario 2 .41 1.14 10
scenario 3 -.70 1.81 10
scenario 4 -.43 .82 10
scenario 5 -.60 1.48 10
Aggravating Justification-all scenarios -.32 1.47 50
scenario 1 .10 1.53 10
scenario 2 .42 1.79 10
scenario 3 -.33 .70 10
scenario 4 -.29 1.16 10
scenario 5 -1 .48 1.45 10
Mitigating Excuse-for all scenarios -.49 1.66 50
scenario 1 -.93 1.74 10
scenario 2 -.02 1.48 10
scenario 3 -.87 1.55 10
scenario 4 .46 1.31 10
scenario 5 -1.07 1.93 10
Agendizing-for all scenarios -.06 1.98 50
scenario 1 .19 1.64 10
scenario 2 1.32 1.84 10
scenario 3 -.61 1.30 10
scenario 4 1.06 .64 10
scenario 5 -2 .23 2.02 10
Form ulating-for all scenarios -.16 1.83 50
scenario 1 -.24 2.02 10
scenario 2 .40 1.44 10
scenario 3 .03 1.89 10
scenario 4 .66 1.18 10
scenario 5 -1.66 1.86 10
C ontro l-for all scenarios -.10 1.22 50
scenario 1 -.21 .77 10
scenario 2 .19 1.26 10
scenario 3 -.64 1.47 10
scenario 4 .76 .94 10
scenario 5 -.59 1.17 10
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Table D-3: Difference Between Alignment Talk User and Speaker Not Using
Alignment Talk on Status Factor
Form of Talk Mean Standard Deviation Number
Hedging-for all scenarios -.29 1.49 50
scenario 1 -.27 .93 10
scenario 2 -.33 .82 10
scenario 3 .17 1.85 10
scenario 4 .03 .43 10
scenario 5 -1.07 2.42 10
Credentialing-for all scenarios .01 1.24 50
scenario 1 .03 .84 10
scenario 2 .27 1.20 10
scenario 3 -.10 1.83 10
scenario 4 -.10 1.22 10
scenario 5 -.07 1.16 10
Aggravating Justification-all scenarios -.10 1.43 50
scenario 1 -.13 .32 10
scenario 2 -.43 1.58 10
scenario 3 -.23 1.84 10
scenario 4 .17 1.44 10
scenario 5 .13 1.68 10
Mitigating Excuse-for all scenarios -.44 1.59 50
scenario 1 -.43 1.24 10
scenario 2 -1.07 1.51 10
scenario 3 -.77 2.34 10
scenario 4 -.67 1.09 10
scenario 5 .73 1.06 10
Agendizing-for all scenarios -.40 1.72 50
scenario 1 -.20 1.29 10
scenario 2 .20 1.56 10
scenario 3 -1.03 1.52 10
scenario 4 -.27 1,34 10
scenario 5 -.70 2.64 10
Form ulating-for all scenarios .17 1.72 50
scenario 1 1.07 1.62 10
scenario 2 .27 1.00 10
scenario 3 .20 2.66 10
scenario 4 -.40 1.14 10
scenario 5 -.27 1.60 10
C ontrol-for all scenarios -.08 .73 50
scenario 1 .03 .66 10
scenario 2 .10 .67 10
scenario 3 -.43 .70 10
scenario 4 -.23 .63 10
scenario S .13 .92 10
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Table D-4: Means and Standard Deviations for Alignment Talk User
on Niceness Factor
Form of Talk Mean Standard Deviation Number
Hedging-for all scenarios 4.19 .94 50
scenario 1 4.17 .87 10
scenario 2 4.16 .80 10
scenario 3 4.23 1.38 10
scenario 4 3.76 .73 10
scenario 5 4.61 .75 10
Credentialing-for all scenarios 4.18 .87 50
scenario 1 4.51 .96 10
scenario 2 4.08 .95 10
scenario 3 4.54 .44 10
scenario 4 3.36 .85 10
scenario 5 4.39 .60 10
Aggravating Justification-all scenarios 3.56 .91 50
scenario 1 3.62 .56 10
scenario 2 3.22 1.08 10
scenario 3 3.99 1.15 10
scenario 4 3.26 .92 10
scenario 5 3.73 .63 10
Mitigating Excuse-for all scenarios 3.70 1.07 50
scenario 1 4.11 .80 10
scenario 2 3.49 1.10 10
scenario 3 3.48 1.01 10
scenario 4 2.87 .81 10
scenario 5 4.55 .97 10
Agendizing-for all scenarios 3.71 1.26 50
scenario 1 4.36 1.04 10
scenario 2 3.69 1.17 10
scenario 3 3.74 .79 10
scenario 4 2.66 1.67 10
scenario 5 4.09 .96 10
Form ulating-for all scenarios 3.73 1.09 50
scenario 1 4.22 .70 10
scenario 2 3.84 .98 10
scenario 3 3.70 1.37 10
scenario 4 2.67 .66 10
scenario 5 4.25 .92 10
Control-for all scenarios 4.00 .79 50
scenario 1 4.16 .90 10
scenario 2 4.04 .79 10
scenario 3 4.31 .59 10
scenario 4 3.29 .84 10
scenario 5 4.22 .42 10
112
Table D -5: Means and Standard Deviations for Alignment Talk User
on Dominance Factor
Form of Talk Mean Standard Deviation Number
Hedging-for all scenarios 4.12 .91 50
scenario 1 3.90 .62 10
scenario 2 4.40 .79 10
scenario 3 4.10 1.37 10
scenario 4 4.46 .68 10
scenario 5 3.76 .89 10
Credentialing-for all scenarios 4.42 .89 50
scenario 1 4.76 1.01 10
scenario 2 4.60 .67 10
scenario 3 4.44 1.35 10
scenario 4 4.42 .32 10
scenario 5 3.89 .64 10
Aggravating Justification-all scenarios 4.41 .95 50
scenario 1 4.37 .72 10
scenario 2 4.46 1.00 10
scenario 3 5.02 .91 10
scenario 4 4.34 .91 10
scenario 5 3.84 1.00 10
M itigating Excuse-for all scenarios 4.12 1.08 50
scenario 1 3.80 1.08 10
scenario 2 4.24 .82 10
scenario 3 4.44 1.27 10
scenario 4 4.70 .83 10
scenario 5 3.42 1.01 10
Agendizing-for all scenarios 4.78 1.10 50
scenario 1 4.69 .87 10
scenario 2 5.22 .79 10
scenario 3 5.07 .81 10
scenario 4 5.41 .67 10
scenario 5 3.53 1.28 10
Form ulating-for all scenarios 4.61 1.08 50
scenario 1 4.47 .86 10
scenario 2 4.56 .97 10
scenario 3 5.26 .87 10
scenario 4 5.26 .71 10
scenario 5 3.50 1.02 10
Contro l-for all scenarios 4.21 .70 50
scenario 1 4.09 .66 10
scenario 2 4.20 .78 10
scenario 3 4.29 .63 10
scenario 4 4.60 .83 10
scenario 5 3.87 .46 10
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Table D-6: Means and Standard Deviations for Alignment Talk User
on Status Factor
Form of Talk Mean Standard Deviation Number
Hedging-for all scenarios 4.13 .95 50
scenario 1 4.00 .74 10
scenario 2 4.03 97 10
scenario 3 4.47 1.01 10
scenario 4 4.37 1.02 10
scenario 5 3.77 .98 10
Credentialing-for all scenarios 4.11 .70 50
scenario 1 4.10 .47 10
scenario 2 4.37 .78 10
scenario 3 3.93 .66 10
scenario 4 4.00 .63 10
scenario 5 4.13 .92 10
Aggravating Justification-all scenarios 4.08 .82 50
scenario 1 4.03 .53 10
scenario 2 3.77 .82 10
scenario 3 4.20 .85 10
scenario 4 4.30 .88 10
scenario 5 4.10 .99 10
Mitigating Excuse-for all scenarios 3.90 .93 50
scenario 1 3.90 .67 10
scenario 2 3.60 .98 10
scenario 3 3.80 1.24 10
scenario 4 3.90 .98 10
scenario 5 4.30 .69 10
Agendiaing-for all scenarios 3.79 1.04 50
scenario 1 4.03 .81 10
scenario 2 4.10 .96 10
scenario 3 3.50 .84 10
scenario 4 3.83 1.24 10
scenario 5 3.50 1.31 10
Form ulating-for all scenarios 4.36 1.14 50
scenario 1 4.80 .83 10
scenario 2 4.57 .77 10
scenario 3 4.20 1.38 10
scenario 4 4.50 1.21 10
scenario 5 3.73 1.29 10
Control-for all scenarios 4.09 .69 50
scenario 1 4.37 .64 10
scenario 2 4.00 .44 10
scenario 3 4.07 .61 10
scenario 4 3.97 .71 10
scenario 5 4.07 .99 10
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Table D-7: Means and Standard Deviations on Niceness Factor
for Speaker Not Using Alignment Talk
Form of Talk Mean Standard Deviation Number
Hedging-for all scenarios 4.24 1.17 50
scenario 1 4.71 .78 10
scenario 2 4.71 .98 10
scenario 3 2.85 1.17 10
scenario 4 4.25 .86 10
scenario 5 4.68 .93 10
Credentialing-for all scenarios 4.20 1.07 50
scenario 1 5.02 .58 10
scenario 2 4.82 .42 10
scenario 3 2.85 1.00 10
scenario 4 4.07 .94 10
scenario 5 4.22 .82 10
Aggravating Justification-all scenarios 4.33 1.13 50
scenario 1 4.81 .75 10
scenario 2 4.84 1.05 10
scenario 3 2.93 1.11 10
scenario 4 4.40 .83 10
scenario 5 4.66 .67 10
Mitigating Excuse-for all scenarios 4.51 .98 50
scenario 1 4.92 .53 10
scenario 2 4.93 .88 10
scenario 3 3.65 1.24 10
scenario 4 4.46 .79 10
scenario 5 4.62 .87 10
Agendizing-for all scenarios 4.51 1.28 50
scenario 1 5.28 .93 10
scenario 2 4.72 .78 10
scenario 3 3.50 1.27 10
scenario 4 4.23 1.63 10
scenario 5 4.80 1.09 10
Form ulating-for all scenarios 4.51 1.16 50
scenario 1 5.06 .53 10
scenario 2 4.99 .63 10
scenario 3 3.17 1.57 10
scenario 4 4.73 1.04 10
scenario 5 4.59 .68 10
Contro l-for all scenarios 4.22 1.00 50
scenario 1 4.59 .50 10
scenario 2 4.60 .76 10
scenario 3 3.10 1.30 10
scenario 4 4.48 .76 10
scenario 5 4.32 .77 10
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Table D -8: Means and Standard Deviations on Dominance Factor
for Speaker Not Using Alignment Talk
Form of Talk Mean Standard Deviation Number
Hedging-for all scenarios 4.84 .99 50
scenario 1 4.59 .69 10
scenario 2 4.34 1.15 10
scenario 3 5.20 1.01 10
scenario 4 4.69 .69 10
scenario 5 5.40 1.10 10
Credentialing-for all scenarios 4.65 .89 50
scenario 1 4.60 .99 10
scenario 2 4.18 .59 10
scenario 3 5.14 1.06 10
scenario 4 4.84 .64 10
scenario 5 4.49 .94 10
Aggravating Justification-all scenarios 4.72 .94 50
scenario 1 4.27 .89 10
scenario 2 4.05 .83 10
scenario 3 5.34 .89 10
scenario 4 4.63 .48 10
scenario 5 5.33 .85 10
Mitigating Excuse-for all scenarios 4.61 1.13 50
scenario 1 4.73 .98 10
scenario 2 4.26 .89 10
scenario 3 5.31 1.01 10
scenario 4 4.24 1.31 10
scenario 5 4.49 1.28 10
Agendizing-for all scenarios 4.84 1.18 50
scenario 1 4.50 .84 10
scenario 2 3.90 1.17 10
scenario 3 5.69 .81 10
scenario 4 4.36 .84 10
scenario 5 5.76 1.00 10
Form ulating-for all scenarios 4.77 1.25 50
scenario 1 4.72 1,31 10
scenario 2 4.16 1.04 10
scenario 3 5.23 1.39 10
scenario 4 4.60 1.07 10
scenario 5 5.16 .92 10
Control-for all scenarios 4.31 .93 50
scenario 1 4.30 .76 10
scenario 2 4.02 .88 10
scenario 3 4.93 1.12 10
scenario 4 3.84 .66 10
scenario 5 4.46 .94 10
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Table D -9: Means and Standard Deviations on Status Factor
for Speaker Not Using Alignment Talk
Form of Talk Mean Standard Deviation Number
Hedging-for all scenarios 4.42 1.14 50
scenario 1 4.27 .52 10
scenario 2 4.37 .80 10
scenario 3 4.30 1.18 10
scenario 4 4.33 1.15 10
scenario 5 4.83 1.66 10
Credentialing-for all scenarios 4.10 .77 50
scenario 1 4.07 .54 10
scenario 2 4.10 .72 10
scenario 3 4.03 1.27 10
scenario 4 4.10 .72 10
scenario 5 4.20 .54 10
Aggravating Justification-all scenarios 4.18 .86 50
scenario 1 4.17 .48 10
scenario 2 4.20 .79 10
scenario 3 4.43 1.11 10
scenario 4 4.13 .93 10
scenario  5 3.97 .99 10
Mitigating Excuse-for all scenarios 4.34 .96 50
scenario 1 4.33 .63 10
scenario 2 4.67 .72 10
scenario 3 4.57 1.27 10
scenario 4 4.57 .72 10
scenario 5 3.57 1.04 10
Agendi2 ing -for all scenarios 4.19 1.10 50
scenario 1 4.23 .93 10
scenario 2 3.90 .72 10
scenario 3 4.53 1.29 10
scenario 4 4.10 .61 10
scenario 5 4.20 1.70 10
Form ulating-for all scenarios 4.19 1.21 50
scenario 1 3.73 1.01 10
scenario 2 4.30 .88 10
scenario 3 4.00 1.66 10
scenario 4 4.90 .88 10
scenario 5 4.00 1.34 10
Contro l-for all scenarios 4.17 .79 50
scenario 1 4.33 .57 10
scenario 2 3.90 .89 10
scenario 3 4.50 .88 10
scenario 4 4.20 .74 10
scenario 5 3.93 .83 10
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